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REVISED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9: IMPACT IN
BANKRUPTCY
BY: C. SCOTT PRYOR*

INTRODUCTION

At its meeting from July 24-31, 1998, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL")' approved the final draft of a
complete revision of Article 9 ("Revised Article 9") of the Uniform Commercial
Code ("U.C.C."). 2 The American Law Institute ("ALI")3 previously approved this
draft of Revised Article 9 on May 13, 1998. 4 Many articles have already appeared
describing the changes from the current Article 9.5 Most, if not all, of these changes
Associate Professor, Regent University School of Law. J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School.
I wish to thank Daniel J. Bussel and Russell A. Eisenberg for their helpful comments on prior drafts. I also
wish to thank D. Anthony Wright (Regent University School of Law Class of 1999) and Eric Welsh for their
valuable research assistance and William W.C. Harty (Class of 2000) for his editorial contributions.
1 NCCUSL is a national organization of practicing lawyers, judges, law professors, and others appointed
by the governor of each state. See Diane W. Savage, The Impact of Proposed Article 2B of the Uniform
Commercial Code on ConsumerContracts for Information and Computer Software, 9 LOY. CONSUMER L.

REP. 251, 253 (1997) (stating that U.C.C. was drafted and revised by ALI and NCCUSL, which is a natiofial
organization "composed of commissioners appointed from every state"); Thomas J. Stipanowich,
Reconstructing Construction Law: Reality and Reform in a Transactional System, 1998 WIS. L. REV.

463, 548 (stating that NCCUSL "is a body of men and women representing each of the fifty states,... [which]
exists primarily through appropriations from the states, [and which] has drafted more than 200 uniform laws
on a wide variety of subjects."). NCCUSL drafts uniform laws in various fields and then proposes them to
at 549-50.
the various state legislatures for adoption. See id.
2 See Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 9 - Secured Transactions (with conforming amendments
to Articles 1, 2, 2A, 4, 6, 7, and 8) (American Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws 1999); see also Barbara Clark and Barkley Clark, Special Report: New Article 9,
31 U.C.C. L.J. 243, 243 (1999) (noting that NCCUSL approved final draft at its 1998 annual meeting); Fred
Miller, Whither the States and Revised UC.C. Article 9, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 335, 335 (1998)
(stating that revisions to Article 9 of U.C.C. were approved by ALI and NCCUSL in May and July of 1998).
3 The ALI was founded in 1923 to promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better
adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of justice, and to encourage and carry on
scholarly and scientific legal work.' See, e.g., Fred H. Miller, U.C.C. Articles 3, 4 and 4A: A Study in

Process and Scope, 42 ALA. L. REV. 405, 405 (1991); Savage, supra note 1, at 253. Its principal products
have been the various Restatements of the common law.
4

See Alvin C. Harrell, UCC Article 9 Revisions Move Toward Summer 1998 Approval, Pt. II,

52 CONSUMER. FIN. L.Q. REP. 227, 227 (1998) (stating that Article 9 revisions were approved by ALI at
their Spring 1998 meeting held on May 13, 1998); Miller, supra note 2, at 335 (explaining that revisions to
Article 9 of U.C.C. were approved by NCCUSL and ALI in May and July of 1998).
See Clark and Clark, supra note 2, at 243 (discussing significant changes to Article 9 and how Revised
Article 9 affects current laws); George A. Hisert, Letters of Credit Under Revised UCC Article 9, 31 U.C.C.

L.J. 458 (1999) (explaining how Revised Article 9 affects "security interests in rights under a letter of
credit"); George A. Nation HI, Revised Article 9 of the U.C.C.: The ProposedRevisions Most Important to
CommercialLenders, 115 BANKING L.J. 212, 214 (1998) (discussing increased scope of Revised Article 9
and changes it would make if adopted); Peter Siviglia, Perfection of Security Interests By Filing Under the
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will be significant to the bankruptcy bench and bar.6 This article will focus on the
systemic impact that Revised Article 9 will have in bankruptcy.7
Part I of this Article will briefly describe the history and evolution of Revised
Article 9. Part II will focus on the two most substantial areas of impact of Revised
Article 9 in bankruptcy: reduction in the effect of the trustee's avoiding powers
under Bankruptcy Code section 544 and the expansion of the secured creditor's
interest in proceeds under Bankruptcy Code section 552(b). Part m will address
some other areas of impact of Revised Article 9 while Part IV will conclude with
some observations about the net impact of these revisions in bankruptcy.

I.

THE ORIGINS OF REVISED ARTICLE 9

Three organizations control the Official Text of the Uniform Commercial
Code: NCCUSL, the ALl, and the Permanent Editorial Board ("PEB"). 8 The ALl

1998 Revisions to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 U.C.C. L.J. 444, 444 (1999)
(explaining how Article 9 affects filing to perfect security interest); Steven 0. Weise, A Comparison of a
Security Agreement Under the CurrentArticle 9 and the Draft New Article 9, 31 U.C.C. L.J. 131 passim
(1998) (providing sample security agreement to explain differences between current Article 9 and revised
Article 9).
6 See R. JORDAN AND W. WARREN, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 463 (4th ed. 1997)
("No lawyer can competently advise on the planning of secured transactions without a detailed
understanding of the Bankruptcy Code's impact on Article 9 security interests."); Samuel J.M. Donnelly &
Mary Ann Donnelly, Commercial Law, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 109, 154 (1993) (discussing relationship
between bankruptcy and Article 9 of Uniform Commercial Code); Philip T. Billard, Note, Bankrupting the
Proceeds Section: Recent Interpretations of Section 9-306(4)(d) of the Uniform Commercial Code,

55 TEx. L. REv. 891, 892 (1977) (noting that Article 9 of UCC impacts federal Bankruptcy Act).
7 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 - 1330 (1994). Of course, the Bankruptcy Code is a moving target. At this writing,
the House of Representatives has passed H.R. 833, 106th Cong. (1999) and the Senate Judiciary Committee
has approved S. 625, 106th Cong. (1999) (accepting Bankruptcy reform by amending Title XI to include
such programs as "Debtor Financial Management Training Test Program"). However, none of the currently
proposed changes to the Bankruptcy Code will materially impact the conclusions of this article.
8The agreement between NCCUSL and the ALI creating the PEB places on the PEB the responsibility of
studying the need for modernization or other improvements to the U.C.C. See Henry D. Gabriel, The
Inapplicabilityof the United Nations Convention on the InternationalSale of Goods As a Model for the
Revision of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 TuL. L. REv. 1995, 2014 n.4 (1998). The

PEB is composed of members of both NCCUSL and the ALI, and periodically makes recommendations to
NCCUSL and the ALl for revisions to the U.C.C. See Agreement Describing the Relationship of the
American Law Institute, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the
Permanent Editorial Board with Respect to the Uniform Commercial Code, 187-192 (July 31, 1986)

(amended January 18, 1998); Frederick H. Miller & Patricia B. Fry, Introduction to the Uniform
CommercialCode Annual Survey: Good News and BadNews, 45 Bus. LAW 2281, 2281 (1990) (noting that

PEB aids sponsoring bodies of U.C.C. by monitoring U.C.C.'s operation and recommending further steps
for development). The American Bar Association (A.B.A.) also provides one or more persons to act as
liaison to any committee charged with revising the U.C.C. See Peter Winship, Law Making and Article 6 of
the Uniform CommercialCode, 41 ALA. L. REv. 673, 681-83 (1990) (stating that advisor was appointed to
PEB to assist in revision of UCC). In the case of Revised Article 9, the A.B.A. (or its committees) appointed
five advisors. See Nation, supra note 5, at 212 (stating that ALl, NCCUSL and PEB established study
committee to determine if Article 9 of U.C.C. should be revised).
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and NCCUSL combined efforts beginning in the 1940s to create the U.C.C. 9 The

U.C.C. was (and arguably still is) the most ambitious reform of American law and
is now operative in all American jurisdictions except Louisiana.1 °
A.

The PEB Study Report
In 1990, the PEB created a committee to study Article 9 (the "PEB Study

Group") and to recommend whether it needed revision."

Two years later, on

December 1, 1992, the PEB Study Group issued its report and recommended a
series of revisions to Article 9.I2 The PEB Study Report suggested three broad

areas of change: scope of Article 9; enforcement and perfecting a security interest,
and improving the public notice function of perfection.13 Revised Article 9 adopted
14
most of the Study Committee's recommendations with a number of modifications.
Yet focusing on these areas of concern helps to clarify the significance of the final
result of the revision process.
The PEB Study Report proposed to allow a single filing with respect to a
debtor regardless of the form of the collateral. 5 The current 1972 version of Article
9 generally provides that a financing statement must be filed in the state where
goods such as inventory and equipment are located, and in the state of the debtor's
chief executive office for intangible collateral such as accounts and general

9 See William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 1-3 (1967) (discussing NCCUSL negotiations with ALI to
create group large enough to prepare Code); Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436, 1446 (1997) (stating that ALl and NCCUSL created Uniform Commercial
Code); see also Richard L. Savage, mI,Laying the Ghost of Reliance to Rest in Section 2-313 of the
Uniform Commercial Code: An "Endpoints" Analysis, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1065, 1066 (1993)
(stating that although there were many compromises made between Karl Llewellyn's 1940 draft and
Committee's 1952 version, Llewellyn's revolutionary ideas remained).
10 See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 83 (1977) (describing influences of various
personalities on drafting of U.C.C., and history of its development). Louisiana nonetheless adopted Article 9
of the U,C.C. in 1988, which became effective January 1, 1990. See LA. REV. STAT. 10:9-101 (1993);
see also Brill v. Catfish Shaks of America, 727 F. Supp. 1035, 1041 n. 10 (E.D. La. 1989) (stating that
"[e]ffective January 1, 1975, Louisiana adopted part, but not all of the UCC.").
11The Study Committee's specific charge was to "[recommend] whether Article 9 and related provisions
of the U.C.C. [were] in need of revision." See PEB Study Group, Uniform Commercial Code Article 9:
Report, 1 (1992) (hereinafter "PEB Study Report"). It was composed of sixteen members (including its
chair) plus four advisors, assisted by two reporters. See id. at 2-3. The Committee met a total of seven times,
each meeting usually lasting two and one-half days. See id. at 4. The Committee also received input from
approximately twelve advisory groups on a variety of specialized topics. See id.
12See PEB Study Report, supra note 11, at 18-42.
13See PEB Study Report, supra note 11, at 10; see also Nation, supra note 5, at 213 (describing increased
scope of Article 9).
'4 See Revised U.C.C. § 9 (referring to number of changes UCC has made to improve footing
of secured
creditors in addition to other important aspects).
15See PEB Study Report, supra note 11, Recommendation B.9.A., at 22, 74-78 (recommending that
Drafting Committee eliminate "location of the collateral" rule and make law of jurisdiction in which debtor
is located sole rule for perfecting security interest in both tangible and intangible property).
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intangibles. 16 A single place of filing would have gone far toward unifying the
notice system of perfection without federalizing it.
The second area where the PEB Study Group proposed a significant change
increased the scope of Article 9 in connection with deposit accounts. 17 The PEB
Study Report recommended that the scope of Article 9 be increased to cover
deposit accounts as collateral. 18 At present, to the extent a deposit account contains
proceeds of collateral, and to the extent those proceeds can be identified, 19 a
secured creditor has a security interest in that deposit account ° under current
U.C.C. section 9-306(1). The deposit account itself, however, may not currently
serve as collateral. 2' The recommendation of the PEB Study Report would have
reversed that result simply by making deposit accounts available as original
collateral.2

'6

See U.C.C. § 9-103 (1996) (stating that perfection of documents, instruments and ordinary goods is

governed by law ofjurisdiction where collateral is located, while perfection of accounts, general intangibles
and mobile goods is governed by laws of jurisdiction in which debtor is located (including conflict of laws
rules)).
17 See PEB Study Group, supra note 11, at 68 (understanding the need for Article 9 to encompass
deposit
accounts).
'a See PEB Study Report, supra note 11, Recommendation A.7.A., at 21, 68-71 (recommending that
Article 9 be revised to include deposit accounts as original collateral).
'9 See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1994) (suggesting that debtor's control over deposit account, coupled with
deposits from sources other than collateral or its proceeds, may make it difficult for secured creditor to trace
and thus identify proceeds in deposit account); see also, e.g., Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank of New
England-Old Colony, 897 F.2d 611, 620-22 (1 st Cir. 1990) (reversing grant of summary judgment to junior
secured creditor in conversion action by senior secured creditor for cash proceeds of joint collateral, based
on policy that third parties (including junior secured creditors) who receive payments from debtor's deposit
account in ordinary course takes free of any security interest (but indicating junior secured creditor would
likely prevail on facts of this case)). See generally Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank of
Portageville, 358 F. Supp. 317, 325-27 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (explaining rules of tracing).
20 See U.C.C. § 9-105(lXe) (1996) (stating that '[d]eposit account' means a demand, time, savings,
passbook or like account maintained with a bank, savings and loan association, credit union, or like
organization, other than an account evidenced by a certificate of deposit"); Frank v. I Commercial Fin.
Corp. (In re Thompson Boat Co.), 230 B.R. 815, 826 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995) (noting that Michigan uses
same definition as U.C.C. for "deposit account"); Wolff v. FWB Bank (In re Richman), 181 B.R. 260, 264
(Bankr. D. Md. 1995) (noting that Maryland uses same definition of "deposit account" as U.C.C).
21 See U.C.C. § 9-104() (1996) (stating "[tlhis articles does not apply.. to a transfer of an interest in any
deposit account (subsection (1) of § 9-105), except as provided with respect to proceeds (§ 9-306) and
priorities in proceeds (§ 9-312)."); P.A. Bergner & Co., v. Bank One (In re P.A. Bergner & Co.),
140 F.3d 1111, 1122 (7th Cir. 1998) (suggesting that bank cannot enforce its security interest in collateral
after honoring customer's letter of credit unless attachment and perfection take place more than 90 days
before bankruptcy).
22 This change would have been consistent with California's non-uniform version of current
U.C.C.
§ 9-104. See CAL. COM. CODE § 9-104 (West Supp. 1998) (stating "this division does not apply to...(L).
Any security interest created by assignment of the benefit..."); see also Parker v. Community First Bank
(In re Bakersfield Westar Ambulance, Inc), 123 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting California
Legislature's failure to incorporate entire Article into California law and its rejection of U.C.C.'s deposit
account exclusion, which excludes deposit accounts from scope of Article 9, except where account
constitutes proceeds from other collateral); Johanson Trans. Serv. v. Rick Pik'd Rite, Inc., 210 Cal. Rptr.
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Next, the PEB Study Report dealt in depth with the rights of buyers in ordinary
course and prepaying buyers' vis-A-vis secured creditors. Buyers in ordinary
course 23 currently take goods from a seller free from a perfected security interest in
those goods.24 The PEB Study Report proposed to limit the current definition of
"buyer in ordinary course" to those who had the right to possession of the
purchased goods under U.C.C. Article 2.25 U.C.C. section 9-307(1) would also have
been amended to preclude the status of a favored buyer in ordinary course, with
respect to goods in the possession of the secured party.2 6 Finally, in a nod toward
unsecured claimants, the PEB Study Group recommended that the U.C.C. be
amended to protect prepaying buyers from a competing security interest in goods in
the event of default by the seller.27

433, 438 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that California does not recognize exceptions to general deposit
accounts exclusion).
23 See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1996):
Buyer in ordinary course of business means a person who in good faith and without
knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security
interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the
business. of selling goods of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker.
Id. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 612 F.2d 745, 751-53 (3d Cir. 1979)
(using U.C.C.'s definition of "buyer in ordinary course"); United States v. Continental Grain Co.,
691 F. Supp. 1193, 1194, 1198 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (relying on U.C.C.'s definition of "buyer in ordinary
course").

24 See U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1998) (stating that buyer in ordinary course of business takes free of security
interest created by his seller even though security interest is perfected and buyer knows of its existence);
Taft v. Jake Kaplan, Ltd. (In re Dexter Buick-GMC Truck Co.), 2 B.R. 253, 254 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1980)
(noting that buyer in ordinary.course of business takes free of third party's perfected security interest even if
it knows of its existence); Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Systems, Inc., 312 N.Y.S.2d 317, 318
(N.Y. 1970) (stating that U.C.C. § 9-307 expressly provides that individual is entitled to its protection even

if it has knowledge of existence of security interest in goods).
25 See

PEB Study Report, supra note 11, Recommendation C.26.A, at 36, 190-92 (clarifying anomaly
between Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 (U.C.C. §§ 2-502, 2-716(1) and 2-716(3)) on one hand, and
U.C.C. § 9-307(1) on other); Alvin C. Harrell, Selected Comments on the UCC PEB Study GroupArticle 9
Report, 47 CONSUMER FN. L.Q. REP. 385, 387 (1993) (noting that PEB Report recommends revising
§ 1-201(9) so that buyers may not qualify as buyers in ordinary course until Article 2 rights of possession

vest).

See PEB Study Report, supra note 11, Recommendation C.26.A, at 36, 190-92 (reversing Tanbro
Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 350 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1976)). The court in Tanbro held that the
primary vendor's security interest in goods remaining in its possession for storage was cut off by its buyer's
subsequent resale to the ultimate purchaser. See id. at 592-93. Compare Homer Kripke, Should Section
9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply Against a Secured Party in Possession?,33 Bus. LAW.
153 passim (1977) (contrasting and criticizing analysis of Tanbro decision) with Harold Birnbaum, Section
9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code Versus Possessory Security Interest - A Reply to Professor
Homer Kripke, 33 Bus. LAW. 2607 passim (1978) (supporting Tanbro decision).
27 See PEB Study Report, supra note 11, Recommendation C.27.A. at 36, 194-98 (codifying Daniel v.
Bank of Haywood, 425 N.W.2d 416 (Wis. 1988)). The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that a
26

consumer's purchase of a van by execution of a motor vehicle purchase contract, together with the surrender
of its current vehicle as a down payment, cut short the secured creditor's interest in the van even though the
van was still in the dealer's possession. See United States v. Handy, 750 F.2d 777, 781 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding buyer was protected in its purchase of "inventory" from secured creditor's interest).

ABI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:465

With the exception of formally recognizing the claims of prepaying buyers to
undelivered goods in the event of a seller's insolvency, each of the
recommendations in the PEB Study Report would have served the interests of
secured creditors. Any expansion of the rights of secured creditors must come at
the expense of an insolvent debtor's other stakeholders. The pattern of incremental
enhancement of a secured creditor's rights would continue through the subsequent
drafting process.
B.

The DraftingCommittee

After receiving the PEB Study Report, NCCUSL (in consultation with the ALI)
appointed the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 Drafting Committee (the
"Drafting Committee") in 1993.28 The Drafting Committee met 14 times over the
next six years, its work culminating in submission of a final draft to the 1998
NCCUSL Annual Meeting. 29 NCCUSL approved the final draft subject to stylistic
adjustments after which it came before the ALI Council for its final approval.3 °
The draft has been submitted to the states for adoption starting in 1999. The
proposed effective date for Revised Article 9 is July 1, 2001.31 In addition to
reorganizing and renumbering virtually all of the provisions of the current version
of Article 9, the Drafting Committee made a number of substantive changes. A
summary of some of the most significant changes follows.
28

See Edward J. Heiser, Jr. & Robert J.Flemma, Jr., Consumer Issues in the Article 9 Revision Project:

The Perspective of Consumer Lenders, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 488, 488 (1994); Fred H. Miller, The
Revision of U.C.C. Article 9, 47 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 257, 258 (1993) (stating that "[a] drafting
committee to revise Article 9 has been constituted"); James M. Swartz & Paul D. Steinkraus, Planned
Changes to UCC Article 9 Pose Significant Risks to Creditors, METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL,
MID-ATLANTIC FIRMS, June 1997 (mentioning that current efforts to revise Article 9 were initiated based on
recommendations of study group by PEB of UCC).
29See Revised U.C.C. § 9-101 Official Cmt. 2; Neil Cohen, Commercial Law PreparingNow for Revised
Article 9, N.Y.L.J. Feb. 19, 1999, at 3 (mentioning that Revised U.C.C. § 9-701 provides that revised article
is not effective until July 1, 2001).
30 The history of arduous and sometimes contentious work of the Drafting Committee can be found in the
articles referenced above. See Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail:
Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 576 (1998) (discussing near collapse

of Article 9 Drafting Committee over efforts to include consumer protection provisions in remedial sections
of Revised Article 9); Fred H. Miller, Realism Not Idealism in Uniform Laws - Observations From the

Revision of the UCC, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 707, 709 (1998) (critiquing criticisms of process of revising
Article 9 by those not involved in process); Steve H. Nickles, Consider Process Before Substance,
69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 589, 595 (1995) (urging merger of Drafting Committee and Bankruptcy Review
Commission to give political legitimacy to perceived insular Article 9 revision process); Kathleen Patchel,
Interest Group Politics, Federalism and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform

Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83, 85-86 (1993) (questioning adequacy of uniform laws process as
means of promulgating commercial law rules); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The PoliticalEconomy of
Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595, 597 (1995) (using "structure-induced equilibrium" theory to
study activities of ALl and NCCUSL on theory that they act as private legislatures); supra note 28 (noting
that PEB study group recommended revising Article 9).
31See Revised U.C.C. § 9-701 (1999) (stating that effective date of Revised Article 9 is July 1, 2001);
Patrick Guiday, 1999 Financing Health Care Providers, ALI-ABA Course Study 401, 434 (1999)

(stating that "[t]he proposed 'Uniform Effective Date' for the revised Article 9 is July 1, 2001.").
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Scope

In response to the Study Committee's recommendations,32 the Drafting
Committee's final product expands the scope of Revised Article 9 in several
important areas. First, Revised Article 9 significantly broadens the definition of
accounts so that it now includes payment obligations arising out of the sale, lease
or license of all kinds of tangible and intangible property, as well as credit card
receivables. 33 These changes both increase collateral available as security (and thus
reduce the residuum for unsecured creditors) and decrease the "catch-all" category
of general intangibles.
Second, Revised Article 9 makes a significant change to the current laws broad
exclusion of insurance claims from Article 9 coverage.3 4 Most insurance claims
will continue to be outside the scope of Revised Article 9;35 however, a health-care
provider will be able to use "health-care-insurance receivables 36 as collateral. This
change recognizes the increasing need for the health-care industry to finance
receivables, and, as a result, should spark more traditional forms of lending to

PEB Study Report, supra note 11, Recommendations A. 1-7, at 18-42.
Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2)(ii) and (iv) (1999); see also U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2)(viii)
(defining "account" broadly to include even such rights of payment as lottery winnings); Nation, supra note
5, at 217 (1998) (noting how Revised Article 9 broadens definition of account).
3 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-104(g). But see U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (excepting insurance proceeds to extent
payable on account of loss or damage to collateral); see also Rheade H. Ryan, Jr., Trade Receivables
Purchases, ALI-ABA Course Study 305, 311 (1999) (noting Revised Article 9 expands scope to cover
health care insurance receivables defined as interest in or claim under policy of insurance, which is right to
payment of monetary obligation for health care goods or services provided in § 9-102(aX2) and (4)).
35 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-109(dX8):
This article does not apply to...a transfer of an interest in or an assignment of a claim
under a policy of insurance, other than an assignment by or to a health-care provider of
a health-care-insurance receivable and any subsequent assignment of the right to
payment, but Sections 9-315 and 9-319 apply with respect to proceeds and priorities in
proceeds.
Id. See, e.g., Revised U.C.C. § 9-109 Official Cmt. 13 (stating that § 9-109 (dX8) narrows broad exclusion
of interests in insurance under former § 9-104(g)); Amanda K. Esquibel, An Article 9 Primer Regarding
Uninsured Collateral Destroyed by a Tortfeasor, 46 KAN. L. REV. 211, 215 (1998) (noting that plain
language ofU.C.C. § 9-104(k)'s exclusion states that Article 9 security interest may not arise from transfer
of any tort claim); infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text (discussing further use of health-carereceivables as collateral).
36 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(aX46) (1999) (stating "'[h]ealth-care-insurance receivable' means an
interest in or claim under a policy of insurance which is a right to payment of a monetary obligation for
health-care goods or services provided."); see also 1999 Financing Health Care Providers, SD 71
ALI-ABA 401,405 (1999) (asserting healthcare providers and their lenders must now rely on collateralizing
provider's assets to get their financing approved, and explaining that collateral packages may include real
estate, tangible personal property, unrestricted or otherwise eligible endowments and trust funds, certain
contract rights, and general intangibles); Edwin E. Smith, Overview of Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 1, 6 (1999) (explaining that insurance claims exclusion of Revised Article 9 is narrowed, and that while
it has generally preserved current Article 9's exclusion for assignments of insurance claims as original
collateral, it includes assignments of insurance claims as original collateral relating to provision of healthcare goods and services).
32

33 See
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health care providers, in place of the curient practice of structured financing of
health care receivables. 7
Finally, Revised Article 9 breaches the wall previously prohibiting the use of
tort claims as collateral.38 Similar to its insurance revisions, Revised Article 9
continues the practice that it does not apply to the creation or perfection of a
security interest in most personal tort claims. 39 However, this long-standing
exclusion no longer applies to "commercial tort claims. 40 Commercial tort claims
are those where the claimant is either an organization or an individual; the claim
arose in the course of the claimant's business and does not involve personal injury
or death.4'
2. Creation and Attachment of a Security Interest
The rules on attachment of a security interest under Revised Article 9 remain
largely unchanged.4 2 The only major modification replaces the current requirement
that the debtor sign the security agreement 43 with one that the debtor "authenticate"
the document.44 The Drafting Committee developed a new concept of

37In structured financing a health care provider typically transfers its health-care receivables to a separate
Special Purpose Vehicle ("SPV"), usually an unassociated trust or corporation. The SPV then issues
securities with repayment obligations that are secured by the newly acquired health-care receivables. To the
extent health care receivables are not eligible as collateral under U.C.C. § 9-104(g), the lender must rely on
common law principles of perfection and priority, which are often unclear and vary from state to state.
See HEALTH CARE INSOLVENCY MANUAL (Gary W. Marsh et al., 1997) (examining current practice of
structured financing); see also Stephen L. Schwacz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN J. L. BUS.
& FIN. 133, passim (1999) (observing that greatest benefit of securitization is its potential for bringing low
cost capital market financing to companies that would otherwise be unable to access capital markets,
however, innovative approaches, such as recently advanced concept of "divisible interest," may permit
hospitals to pool their receivables and reduce transaction costs, making securitization far more feasible and
attractive).
38 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-104(k); see also Harold R. Weinberg, Tort Claims as Collateral:Impact on
Consumer Finance, 49 CONSUMER FN. L.Q. REP. 155, 155 (1995) (observing that Article 9 of Uniform
Commercial Code does not apply to transfer in whole or in part of any claim arising out of tort).
But see Harold R. Weinberg, They Came From "Beyond the Pale": Security Interests in Tort Claims,
83 Ky. L.J. 443, 450 (1995) (examining desirability of bringing tort claims within scope of Article 9).
39 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(12); Smith, supra note 36, at 6 (noting that tort claims exclusion of
Article 9 has also been narrowed and that noncommercial personal injury claims remain excluded from
Article 9); infra notes 120-38 and accompanying text (discussing use of commercial tort claims as
collateral).
40 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(12) (stating "[t]his article does not apply to...(12) an assignment of a
claim arising in tort, other than a commercial tort claim").
41See id.§ 9-102(aX13) (defining commercial tort claims under Code).
42 See id.§ 9-203(b) (1999); id.Official Cmt. 2 (noting Subsection (b) states three prerequisites to
existance of security interest: value, rights or power to transfer rights in collateral, and agreement plus
satisfaction of evidentiary requirement).
43 See U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(a) (1995) (stating "a security interest is not enforceable against
the debtor or
third parties with respect to the collateral and does not attach unless.. .(b)... the debtor has signed a security
agreement which contains a description of the collateral.")
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authentication in recognition of the increasing significance of electronic commerce.
Authentication includes the traditional method of signing the agreement along with
the use of any electronic means by which the authenticating party can be identified
and the authenticity of the record can be established.4 5
Revised Article 9 makes it clear that the security agreement need only describe
the collateral by type (e.g., "inventory") 46 with two exceptions: certain consumer

U.C.C. § 9-203(b) states:
[A] security interest is enforceable against the debtor and third parties with respect to
the collateral only if:
(1) value has been given;
(2) the debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the
collateral to a secured party; and
(3) one of the following conditions is met:
(A) the debtor has authenticated a security agreement that provides a
description of the collateral and, if the security interest covers timber to be
cut, a description of the land concerned;
(B) the collateral is not a certificated security and is in the possession of the
secured party under Section 9-313 pursuant to the debtor's security
agreement;
(C) the collateral is a certificated security in registered form and the security
certificate has been delivered to the secured party under Section 8-301
pursuant to the debtor's security agreement; or
(D) the collateral is deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, investment
property, or letter-of-credit rights, and the secured party has control under
Section 9-104, 9-105, 9-106, or 9-107 pursuant to the debtor's security
agreement.
See Revised U.C.C. § 9-203(b) Official Cmt. 3 (stating that paragraph (3)(A) represents evidentiary
alternatives under which debtor must authenticate security agreement that provides 'description of
collateral).
41 Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(aX7) states:
"Authenticate" means:
(A) to sign; or
(B) to execute or otherwise adopt a symbol, or encrypt or similarly process a
record in whole or in part, with the present intent of the authenticating
person to identify the person and adopt or accept a record.
See Revised Article § 9-102 Official Cmt. 9b (1999) (explaining that "authenticate" and "authenticated
generally replace "sign" and "signed" and that "authenticated" broadens definition of "signed" in § 1-201 to
encompass authentication of ALl records); Harry C. Sigman, The Filing System Under Revised Article 9,
7 Am. BANKR. L. J. 61, 68 (1999) (explaining that Revised Article 9 deletes requirement that filings be
signed).
46 Revised U.C.C. § 9-108(b) (1999) states:
[A] description of collateral reasonably identifies the collateral [in the security
agreement] if it identifies the collateral by:
(1) specific listing;
(2) category;
(3) except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a type of collateral defined in
[the Uniform Commercial Code];
(4) quantity;
(5) computational or allocational formula or procedure; or
(6) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), any other method, if the
identity of the collateral is objectively determinable.
4Revised
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transactions and where the collateral is a commercial tort claim.47 "Super-generic"
descriptions of collateral, although permitted in financing statements, are not
sufficient within the security agreement.48
The following three changes proposed in Revised Article 9 each increase the
pool of assets that can be made subject to a consensual security interest under the
U.C.C. First, the definition of proceeds (in which a security interest continues to
attach automatically) 49 is expanded to include rights arising out of the lease or
license of collateral and claims arising out of defects in or damage to collateral. 50
Second, Revised Article 9 creates a new form of collateral identified as a
"supporting obligation" 5' that is treated as additional collateral for a security
interest in the supported obligation. Thus, if a debtor pledges a promissory note as
collateral for its obligation to a secured creditor, any security or other credit
enhancement for that note is automatically pledged as well.52 Third, Revised
See Revised U.C.C. § 9-108 Official Cmt. 2 (explaining that (1) description of collateral is required for
evidentiary purposes; (2) description will be sufficient if it identifies collateral described; and (3) "serial
number" test is unnecessary).
47 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-108(e)(1) (stating that "[a] description only by type of
collateral defined in the
[U.C.C.] is an insufficient description of... a commercial tort claim.").
48See Revised U.C.C. § 9-108(c) (1999) (stating "[a] description of collateral as 'all the debtor's assets'
or
'all the debtor's personal property' or using words of similar import does not reasonably identify the
collateral."); see also avid L. Kuosman, Sufficiency of The Description of Collateral in a UC.C.Section
9-203 Security Agreement: A Critique of White & Summers' Approach, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 151, 162
(1993) (noting that security agreement must take possible identification of collateral described, and while it
need not point to specific collateral encumbered, it must, at minimum, detail course of inquiry which will
lead to determination of specific items covered); Revised U.C.C. § 9-108 Official Cmt. 5 (stating that
description of collateral "only by type" is sufficient if description reasonably identifies collateral and
contains descriptive component beyond simply "type").
49See Revised U.C.C. § 9-203(f) (stating that "[t]he attachment of a security interest in collateral gives
the
secured party the rights to proceeds provided by § 9-315 and is also attachment of a security interest in a
supporting obligation for the collateral."); Richard L. Barnes, Tracing Commingled Proceeds:
The Metamorphosis of Equity PrinciplesInto UC.C. Doctrine,51 U. PITT. L. REv. 281, 288 (1990) (noting
that U.C.C. § 9-306 provides for automatic attachment and for automatic perfection of security interest in
proceeds in various subsections).
50 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64XD) (1999) (stating that "[p]roceeds means the following property: to
the extent of the value of collateral claims arising out of the loss, nonconformity, or interference with the use
of defects or infringements of rights on, or damage to, the collateral").
1See id § 9-102(a)(77) (stating "supporting obligations" are those sets of rights, such as guaranties and
their collateral and letters of credit, that are generally understood to follow the debt the payment of which
they enhance); see also infra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing impact of automatic perfection in
supporting obligations of Bankruptcy Code § 552(b)).
52 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-203(f) (asserting that automatic perfection is another
benefit included with
automatic attachment of supporting obligations as collateral); see also id. § 9-308(d) (stating that perfecting
security interest in supporting obligation for collateral occurs when perfection of security interest in
collateral itself occurs); id.§ 9-203(g) (stating that "[t]he attachment of a security interest in a right to
payment or performance secured by security interest or other lien on personal or real property is also
attachment of a security interest in the security interest, mortgage, or other lien"). See generally Carl S.
Bjerre, Secured Transaction Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants, Property and Perfection,
84 CORNELL L. REv. 305, 331 (1999) (stating that perfection reduced evidentiary burdens of establishing
priority and protects third parties against debtor's fraudulent assertions that competing interests were
previously conveyed to third parties); Thomas M. Mayer, Understanding the Business, Bankruptcy and
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Article 9 nullifies any provision in an underlying account, promissory note, chattel
paper or even any other law that would restrict the free assignability of such an
account or instrument as collateral 3
3. Perfection
The most visible change to the requirements and methods of perfection by
Revised Article 9 is "medium neutrality." No longer will the debtor need to sign a
financing statement, 54 nor will any written document evidencing perfection be
required. Pure electronic filings will be permitted. 55 Revised Article 9 requires the
debtor's consent to perfection 56 but that consent
is conclusively presumed by statute
57
from execution of the security agreement.
Securities Aspects of Derivatives, Derivatives in Default: Getting Collateral, 721 PLiICOMM
123, 131 (1995) (explaining that perfection is necessary to "guard against creditors who obtain later security
interests because the rule is that first perfected security interest, not first granted security has priority right
to collateral... [and]security party can perfect by filing financing statement with appropriate state or local
official, giving notice to world of its interest in collateral [or by] taking possession of the collateral").
53See Revised U.C.C. § 9-406(d)(1) (stating that term of agreement prohibiting, restricting, or requiring
consent of account debtor to assignment is ineffective); see also Erickson v. Marshall, 771 P.2d 68, 70
(Idaho Ct. App. 1989) (holding that security interests are assignable and guarantor who pays secured debt
on behalf of principal obligor is subrogated to creditor's rights in collateral); Paul M. Shupack, Making
Revised Article 9 Safe for Securitizations: A Brief History, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 167, 177 (1999)
(referring to U.C.C. § 9-406(d) as "successor" to current U.C.C. § 9-318(4) and stating that it "overrides all
anti-assignment clauses."); infra notes 122-26 and accompanying text (discussing free assignability in
health care receivable context).
14 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-502(a) (1999) (excluding signature of debtor from requirements for sufficient
financing statement); id. § 9-502 Official Cmt. 3 (explaining that removal of former U.C.C. § 9-402(1)'s
requirement that debtor's signature appear on financing statement: (1) facilitates paperless filing; and (2)
makes former U.C.C. § 9-402(2)'s exceptions unnecessary); see also In Re Numeric Corp., 485 F.2d
1328, 1331 (1st Cir. 1973) (stating that any writing which adequately describes collateral, carries signature
of debtor, and establishes that in fact security interest was agreed upon, satisfies formal requirements of
Uniform Commercial Code); Scallop Petroleum Co. v. Banque Trad-Credit Lyonnais S.A., 690 F. Supp.
184, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that previous financing statement alone met basic Article 9 requirements
of writing, signed by debtor, describing collateral, and, thus, all that is needed in addition to financing
statement to perfect security interest is another document demonstrating intent).
s" See Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(39) (defining financing statement in terms of filed "record"); see also id.
§ 9-102(aX69) (describing "record" as information either "inscribed on a tangible medium" or contained in
electronic form but "retrievable in perceivable form"); id. § 9-102 Official Cmt. 9(a) (observing that tangible
and intangible forms of filing fall within definition of "record" under Revised Article 9); Nation, supra note
5, at 222 (clarifying that while Revised Article 9 does not require electronic filing, it "clearly allows filing
offices to move in that direction").
56See Revised U.C.C. § 9-509(aXI) (indicating that "[a] person may file an initial financing statement
amendment that adds collateral covered by a financing statement, or amendment that adds a debtor to a
financing statement only if...the debtor authorizes the filing in an authenticated record."); see also id.
§ 9-203(bX3XA) (declaring that security interest is enforceable against debtor and third parties with respect
to collateral, only if certain criteria announced in § 9-203(bX1) & (2) have been met along with
authentication by debtor providing description of collateral and, if interest transfer to be cut, description of
land concerned); Smith, supra note 36, at 13 (remarking that security agreement must be authenticated by
debtor under revisions to Article 9).
57 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-509(b) (asserting that "[b]y authenticating... a security agreement, a debtor...
authorizes the filing of an initial financing statement covering: (1) the collateral described in the security
agreement; and (2) property that becomes collateral under Section 9-315(a)(2)").
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Several other changes in the perfection rules will impact bankruptcy cases more
substantially than electronic filing. First, litigation concerning whether a debtor's
incorrect name on the financing statement is "substantially misleading" will be
virtually eliminated. The new "bright line" rule provides that a financing statement
incorrectly naming the debtor is seriously misleading unless a search of the filing
records office's conducted under the correct name discloses the financing statement
as actually filed. 58 Second, "super-generic" descriptions such as "all assets' will
sufficiently describe the collateral and be enforceable against third parties,
including bankruptcy trustees. 59 Third, the place(s) where financing statements
must be filed are substantially reduced and simplified. 6° With some exceptions, the
place of filing is where the debtor, not the collateral, is located. 61 The exceptions
include the traditional fixtures and similarly locally anchored collateral 62 and
's See id. § 9-506(c) (declaring that "if a search of the records of the filing office under the debtor's correct
name, using the filing offices' standard search logic, if any, would disclose a financing statement that fails
sufficiently to provide the name of the debtor in accordance with § 9-503(a), the name provided does not
make the financing statement seriously misleading."); see also Nation, supra note 5, at 225-26
(analyzing Revised Article 9's rule that failure to state correct name on financing statement is seriously
misleading unless filing office's standard search shows that financing statement was filed under incorrect
name); Sigman, supra note 45, at 62 (explaining that "Revised Article 9 allows for a searcher to rely on a
single search conducted under the correct name of the debtor and penalizes filers only for errors that result
in nondisclosure of the financing statement in a search under the correct name.").
'9 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (providing that "[a] financing statement sufficiently indicates the
collateral that it covers only if the financing statement provides:...(2) an indication that the financing
statement covers all assets or all personal property"). But see Gill v. United States (In re Boogie Enterprises,
Inc.), 866 F.2d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 1989) (asserting that phrase "personal property" in financing statement
is insufficient to perfect interest). See, e.g., Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank (In re I.A. Durbin Inc.),
46 B.R. 595, 598-99 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (finding phrase "all property rights of any kind whatsoever,
whether real, personal, mixed or otherwise, and whether tangible or intangible" insufficient); Merchants
Nat'l Bank of Cedar Rapids v. Halberstadt, 425 N.W. 2d 429, 432 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (stating that phrase
"it being the intention of the debtor to include herein all personal property now owned or hereafter acquired"
insufficient for financing statement).
60 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (1999) (providing locations where financing statement must be filed);
see also Sigman, supra note 45, at 62-63 (arguing that Revised U.C.C. § 9-501 makes intrastate filing
simpler by utilizing one statewide office, and interstate filing under Revised Article 9 leads to fewer filings,
errors, and less litigation).
61 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (stating that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, while a
debtor is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of
perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in collateral."); see also In re Doughty's
Appliance Inc., 236 B.R. 407, 411 (Bankr. D. Or. 1999) (explaining "effects of perfection or non- perfection
of a security interest in collateral are governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is when the
last event occurs on which is based the assertion that the security interest is perfected or unperfected"
(quoting U.C.C. § 9-103(lXb))); In re Gibson, 234 B.R. 776, 780 (Bank. N.D. Ca. 1999) (proposing that "if
the enforceability of the Dragnet Clause is viewed as an issue relating to perfection or the effect of
perfection or non perfection, that issue will be determined under California law" because collateral has
always been in California).
62 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-301(3)-(4) (stating that while collateral is in jurisdiction, local law of that
jurisdiction applies to "perfection of a security interest in the goods by filing a fixture filing.. .and... the

effect of perfection or nonperfection and the priority of a non-possessory security interest in the collateral.");
Carle S. Bjerre, InternationalProject Finance Transactions: Selected Issues Under Revised Article 9,
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possessory security interests. 63 Revised Article 9 also makes determining the
location of the debtor easier by a series of three rules. 64 The correct place of filing
will be; the state of organization for an entity created by registration with a state
(e.g., a corporation), the state of the entity's chief executive office for entities not
created by registration with a state (e.g., most general partnerships), or the state of
an individual's principal residence.65
Finally, Revised Article 9 expands the kinds of collateral in which a security
interest may be perfected by filing (rather than possession). 66 Unlike current law,
which requires possession for perfection of security interests in money and
instruments, 67 the new regime will permit perfection by filing in instruments and
68 Perfection
several other forms of collateral historically associated with the pledge.
69
by possession will continue to be possible for most of these items.
73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 119, 121 (1999) (explaining that except for fixtures, process for perfecting security
interest will occur in state where debtor has its corporate charter or organization document).
63 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (granting exception to rules determining place of filing for possessory
security interests). Even though perfection by filing is generally reduced to a single place under Revised
Article 9, the limited issues of priority and the effect of perfection of security interests in goods, documents,
instruments, money, negotiable documents, and tangible chattel paper are determined by the law of the situs
of the collateral. See Patrick J. Borchers, Choice of Law Relative to Security Interests and Other Liens in
InternationalBankruptcies, 46 AM. J. CoMP. L. 165, 190 (1998) (taking note of exception that possessory
security interests, or those where creditor has possession of collateral, are governed by law ofjurisdiction of
collateral's situs).
64 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-307 (b) (listing rules to be used for determining debtor's location);
see also Bjerre, supra note 62, at 131 (observing that there may be difficulties with "place of organization"
filing requirement for registered organizations); Borchers, supra note 63, at 189 (noting that prior to
revisions determining debtors' "location" was often difficult).
65 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-307(b) (declaring that place of filing is determined by individual's
place of
residence and by chief executive for organization with more than one place of business); id. § 9-307(e)
(asserting that place of filing for registered organization is state of organization); see also Caseel v. Kolb,
72 Cal. App. 4th 568, 575 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating notice inquiry filing of UCC-1 financing statements
allow interested parties to obtain relevant information regarding security agreement from parties involved in
transaction without necessity of filing entire security agreements, by placing third parties on notice that
another party may have security interest in collateral and further inquiry is required).
Collateral for which something more than filing is necessary for perfection includes money. See Revised
U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(3) (indicating that perfection of money occurs by possession, as well as deposit account
and letter of credit rights); see also id. § 9-312(bXl)-(2) (establishing that it is necessary to show "later
control" so as to prove perfection in deposit accounts and letter of creditor rights); John D. Muller, Selected
Documents In the Law of Cyberspace, 54 BUS. LAW. 403, 415 (1998) (stating that security interest in
electronic chattel paper may be perfected by control).
67 See U.C.C. § 9-304(1) (1977); In re United States Physicians Inc., 1999
WL 557682
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding physician's shares in professional corporation were instruments, security
interest which could be perfected only by possession); see also In re Professional Ins. Management,
130 F.3d 1122, 1130 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that security interest in cash commissions are perfected by
possession as opposed to filing).
68 See Revised U.C.C. §§ 9-310(a), 9-312(a) ("A security interest in chattel paper, negotiable documents,
instruments, or investment property may be perfected by filing."); see also discussion, infra Part II.A.5.
(explaining impact of perfection by dominion on trustees' avoiding powers under Bankruptcy Code
§ 544(a)).
69 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-313(a) ("[A] secured party may perfect a security interest in negotiable
documents, goods, instruments, money, or tangible chattel paper by taking possession of the collateral.");
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There are many further revisions, alterations or modifications of Revised
Article 9, some of which will be discussed in Part II below. 70 However, even this
cursory examination demonstrates the success of the Drafting Committee
incorporating the Study Committee's aspiration that "insofar as the Committee's
recommendations would make it easier and less costly to take and perfect security
interests, they are likely to have the effect of improving the position of secured
creditors relative to that of unsecured creditors."' 1 The net effects of the adoption
of Revised Article 9 will be to reduce the reach of the trustee's avoiding powers
under Bankruptcy Code section 544(a) and to increase the scope of the secured
creditor's claims to proceeds under Bankruptcy Code section 552(b).72
H1. IMPACT ON BANKRUPTCY LAW

Under some situations, which commonly exist in the case of a firm in
bankruptcy, the value realizable through a collective remedy may exceed that of the
creditors' piecemeal exercise of their individual remedies. 73 Among the most
commonly advanced justifications for the institution of bankruptcy is the need for a
collective mechanism of paying multiple claims in the event of insolvency. As a

Nation, supra note 5, at 232 (noting that under Revised Article 9 preference is given to possessory security
interests when security interests conflict); Adam B. Strauss, Reviewing Revised Article 8 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 203, 214 n. 70 (1998) (stating that perfection of security interests in
certified securities can still occur through possession under Article 9).
70 See Bjerre, supra note 62, at 121 (explaining that Revised Article 9 is reconstructed
to reflect many
new issues facing our increasingly complex society); see also Borchers, supra note 63, at 190 (describing
various impacts Revised Article 9 has on perfecting security interests); Larry T. Graven, The Changed (And
Changing?) Uniform Commercial Code, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 285, 344 (1999) (discussing impact of
Article 9 revisions on creditors).
71 PEB Study Report, supra note 11, at 9. See W. Rodney Clement, Jr., Enforcing Security Interests.
in
Personal Property in Mississippi, 67 MIss. L.J. 43, 94-5 n. 256 (1992) (noting lien creditors continue to
have priority over unperfected security interests); Graven, supra note 70, at 344 ("Even more important
[than the costs Revised Article 9 will impose on secured creditors as they change the way they do business],
though, is the tendency of revised Article 9 to favor secured lenders over trade creditors and other unsecured

creditors").

72 See In re Professional Ins. Management, 130 F.3d at 1129 (asserting that
in order to hold secured
position over trustee one must protect its security interest in property); see also Douglas G. Baird & Thomas
H. Jackson, Possession & Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV.
175, 196-201 (1983) [hereinafter BAIRD & JACKSON 1](suggesting that Article 9's scope is inadequate);
David A. Rice, Digital Information As Property and Product: UCC. Article 2B, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV.
621, 643 (1996) (noting that scope of Article 9 includes both tangible and intangible personal property as
collateral).
73See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, CorporateReorganizationsand the Treatment
of Diverse
Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI.
L. REV. 97, 99-102 (1984) [hereinafter BAIRD & JACKSON 2] (critiquing, supporting, and expanding
'creditors' bargain" model of bankruptcy). See generally Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy
Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982). But see Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy
Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777 (1987) (indicating that there is little dissent from fundamental
presupposition that collective nature of bankruptcy is its most salient feature).
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unitary process of liquidation and distribution arguably produces a greater net
return than otherwise.7 4
From the creditors' viewpoint, a corollary to the axiom of a bigger pot through
bankruptcy is the desire for equality of treatment. Exercise of state law collection
remedies focuses on the relationship between the debtor and an individual
creditor." State law remedies are administered on a "first in time is first in right"
basis, 76 therefore individual creditors have every incentive to be the first to
aggressively employ legal mechanisms necessary to enforce their obligations
because there may be nothing left for those who have waited." The relationship
among creditors is important when a debtor is insolvent as the creditors' race of
diligence undermines the goal of achieving the greatest total return on the debtor's
assets. 78 Bankruptcy - the creditors' collective collection remedy - therefore should
treat similarly situated creditors equally or the virtue of collective action may be
subverted.7 9
74 See Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & ECON. 633, 641-42
(1993)
(questioning whether bankruptcy proceeding should focus only on resolving disputes among parties with
rights to debtors assets or should also focus on running ongoing business); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy
Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 141 (1986) (discussing issue of whether
corporate reorganizations should exist at all); Warren, supra note 73, at 781 (questioning whether corporate
reorganizations are desirable process with desirable outcome).
75 See In re Correct Mfg. Corp., 167 B.R. 458, 459 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994) (stating pre-petition
relationship with debtor is threshold requirement for claim); In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619,
626-27 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994) (adopting pre-petition relationship as appropriate for claimants recovery
against debtor); Lynn M. LoPucki, Should The Secured Credit Carve Out Apply Only in Bankruptcy? A
Systems/Strategic Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1483, 1491 (1997) ("The state remedies system has as its
primary purposes the resolution of disputes regarding the existence and amounts of debts and forcible debt
collection").
76 See BAIRD & JACKSON 1, supra note 72, at 194-95; see also Daniel L. Keating, Getting A Handle On
Late Manifesting Claims: A Comment, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1095, 1099 (1994) (noting that state law

collection procedures operate on first come, first served basis); Frederick Tug, Taking Future Claims
Seriously: Future Claims and Successor Liability in Bankruptcy, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 435,

451-52 (1999) (stating that creditors suffer as whole under state law collection rules that divide debtors'
assets on first come, first served basis).
77 See C. TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 4 (1997) ("Under the race of diligence, the first creditors who
grab the debtor's assets will be paid in full. Those who come later in time will get nothing."); see also
J. Bradley Johnson, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213, 241 (1991) (asserting that under
state collection law, creditors must aggressively pursue their state law remedies before debtor's assets are
depleted); Ellen E. Sward, Resolving Conflicts Between Bankruptcy Lav and the State Police Power,

1987 WIS. L. REv. 403, 412-13 (criticizing state law procedures for resulting in "plundering of the debtors
assets by the more aggressive creditors").
78 See Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, passim (1989) (advancing
theme of distributive justice to support equality of creditor treatment); Warren, supra note 73, at 795
(stating that state procedures often lead to poor results). No resolution of the normative rationale for equality
is necessary to acknowledge its significance in the scheme of current bankruptcy law. See Grant Gilmore,
The Good Faith Purchase Ideas and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant

Draftsman, 15A GA. L. REv. 605, 608 (1981) (contending that good faith purchaser left holding bag).
79 See Gilmore, supra note 78, at 613 (reasoning that bankruptcy leaves behind unsecured creditor without
compelling arguments for defeating their property rights); LoPucki, supra note 75, at 1491(recognizing that
two systems - state collective system and bankruptcy - allow potential for inequitable distribution of funds
to like creditors).
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On the other hand, bankruptcy has never functioned in a vacuum. 0 The right to
property, which cannot be taken away without just compensation is guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.8 1 No scheme of bankruptcy
has ever treated every creditor equally because equality of treatment of creditors
without consideration of their property interests would run afoul of the right to
property.82 The Bankruptcy Code explicitly recognizes the right to property with
respect to security interests,8 3 and the Supreme Court has acknowledged this."
Regardless of whether Congress has the power pursuant to the Commerce or
Bankruptcy Clauses of the Constitution8 5 to legislate security interests out of
existence consistently with the Fifth Amendment, it has chosen not to do so. 8 6 The

80 See BAIRD & JACKSON 2, supra note 73, at 97 ("Bankruptcy law does not exist in a vacuum");

id. at 100 (asserting that substantive non-bankruptcy rules "should be changed only when following
bankruptcy code better sustains rights of investors on whole"); see also Lucian A. Bebchuck & Jesse M.
Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105A YALE L. J. 857, 873
(1996) (asserting problems with priority and secured interests). But see Douglas G. Baird, Loss
Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 823 (1987)
(arguing that bankruptcy law should not determine who has priorities when firm fails).
81"No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Framers
would probably have considered the right to property an inalienable "law of nature." See J. LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 754 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1924) (1690).
82The Bankruptcy Code has recognized other reasons for departing from an equality scheme, such as the
nature of the debt (11 U.S.C. § 507), creditor agreement (11 U.S.C. § 5 10(a)) or creditor misconduct

(11 U.S.C. § 510(c)).

83See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 725 (1994) (establishing that Bankruptcy Code's recognition of security
interests as protected property interests does not mean that such interests may not be affected by
bankruptcy); id. at §§ 1 129(bX2)(A), 1225 (a)(5) and 1325 (a)(5) (describing conditions which must be met
in order to have plan confirmed).
8
4See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (stating "[p]roperty interests are created and defined
by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests
should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.");
see also BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994) (observing that federal system is assumed
to defer to traditions of state unless there is clear expression otherwise); Nobleman v. Am. Say. Bank, 508
U.S. 324, 329 (1993) (asserting that property laws fall within purview of states unless clearly specified

otherwise).
85 "The Congress shall have the Power To... regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States... [and] To establish... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.
3-4.
8 See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. George Ruggiere Chrysler-Plymouth (In re George Ruggiere ChryslerPlymouth), 727 F.2d 1017, 1019 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Security interests are 'property rights protected by the
Fifth Amendment from public taking without just compensation.....); James Steven Rogers, The Impairment
of Secured Creditors Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship between the Fifth Amendment
and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARv.L. REv. 973 passim (1983) (asserting that Congress does have power
to eliminate security interests in bankruptcy). It should also be noted that the Rogers article was written
before the resurgence of "takings" jurisprudence in the Supreme Court. See e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994) (indicating that in order for court to find uncompensated taking under Fifth
Amendment, there must be review of nexus between legitimate state interest and permit conditions);
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm. 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-16 (1992) (reviewing relationship between "taking" and
state legislation preventing development of coastal property); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825,
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goal of absolute creditor equality by means of collective debt collection in
bankruptcy, with its virtue of enhancing the collective return of all creditors, cannot
be achieved under the current bankruptcy regime. Consistency with the right of
property, including the right of security interests in property governed by the
U.C.C., precludes this objective.
The Avoiding Powers Under § 544(a)

A.

Although current bankruptcy law mandates recognition of security interests, it
does not require any more for a secured creditor in a collective distribution scheme
than the minimum that that creditor might have received had it exercised its
individual rights outside of bankruptcy. The goal of the bigger pot through
collective efforts is compatible with a rule in bankruptcy eliminating security
interests in property of the estate to the greatest extent possible consistent with the
right of property under state law. Whether under an instrumentalist creditor
bargain model or a distributionist theory of bankruptcy, there is no reason to permit
creditors who have not complied with all steps required to perfect their security
interests to escape the equality of distribution envisioned in bankruptcy.8 8 Secured
creditors without priority over all potential 89competing lien claims in a state forum
will not prevail in a bankruptcy proceeding.
9 from section 70(c) of the
CongressAct
derived
Bankruptcy
Code section
544(a)
9 1 The historical
Bankruptcy
of 1898.
antecedents
of 0section
70(c) illustrated the

831-42 (1987) (discussing generally whether city's prohibition on developing homes on beach access is
"taking" under Fifth Amendment ).
87 See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-BasedTheory of Security Interests: Taking
Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021, 2024 (1994) (validating decisions of debtors to transfer
their property for collateral purposes and respecting personal autonomy and freedom of contract); see also
R. Wilson Freyermuth, Rethinking Proceeds: The History, Misinterpretation and Revision of UC.C.
Section 9-306, 69 TuL. L. REv. 645, 696 (1995) (developing coherent model of what should constitute
proceeds under U.C*C. based on property paradigm of security interests).
8 See Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725, 735 (1984)
("In 'avoiding' the secured party's unperfected security interest, the trustee does not confer victory upon the
unsecured creditor; rather he assures a tie."); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, NonBankruptcy Entitlements
and the Creditors Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 860 (1982) (explaining that "race" system assumes that
creditors are secured but inadvertently forgot to secure their claim).
89 See Fidelity Fin. Serv. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211, 221 (1998) (holding that creditor may invoke enabling
loan exception by satisfying state-law perfection requirements within period required by federal statutes);
Grasso Prod. v. BMO Fin. Inc. (In re Century Offshore Management Corp.), 83 F.3d 140, 143-44
(6th Cir. 1996) (holding that statutory lien pursuant to Louisiana law prevailed over consensual mortgages
held by appellee bank); Pearstein v. United States Small Bus. Admin., 719 F.2d 1169, 1176
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (dictum) ("[i]f the competing.. .lien... had been that of a state or private party, there would
be no question that applicable nonbankruptcy law for determining priority between the liens would be that

of the district").

90 11 U.S.C. § 544(a).states:
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without regard to
any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may avoid
any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is
voidable by-
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concerns associated with secret liens. 92 As commercial practices developed and
methods of public notice of secured transactions became commonplace, the focus
of cases under section 70(c) came to bear on which creditors it protected. 93 Prior to
the widespread adoption of the U.C.C. and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
some uncertainty had existed regarding when unsecured creditors could benefit
from section 70(c). 94 For example, the Second Circuit held that the actual existence
of a creditor with the power to avoid an unperfected lien under state law was not
necessary to avoidance of a security interest under section 70(c). 95 But in Pacific
Finance Corp. v. Edwards96 the Ninth Circuit held that the nonexistence of a single
actual creditor who could have avoided the security interest granted by a
conditional sales contract doomed the trustee's efforts to avoid it for the benefit of
all creditors. 97 Coupled with U.C.C. section 9-301(1)(b), Congress' adoption
of
98
Bankruptcy Code section 544(a) unambiguously rejected Pacific Finance.
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of commencement of the
case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien
on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained such
a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor exists;
(2) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of
the case, and obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, an execution
against the debtor that is returned unsatisfied at such time, whether or not such a
creditor exists; or
(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, from the debtor,
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected, that obtains
the status of a bona fide purchaser and has perfected such transfer at the time of
the commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser exists.
9' 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1975) (describing role of trustee in various stages of bankruptcy).
92See In re Fidelity Tube Corp., 278 F.2d 776, 778 (3d Cir. 1960) (stating that policy of § 70 (c) is to
increase size of bankrupt's estate available to unsecured creditors); Sampsell v. Straub, 194 F.2d 228, 231
(9th Cir. 1951) ("[S]ection 70, sub. c... is employed primarily to protect general creditors of the bankrupt
against secret liens"); Carlos J. Cuevas, Bankruptcy Code Section 544(a) and Constructive Trusts: The
Trustee's Strong Arm Powers Should Prevail, 21 SETON HALL L. REv. 678, 773 (1991) (discussing
relationship of § 544 and constructive trusts and arguing that "express language of § 544(a) was intended to
prevent the imposition of a constructive trust").
.9 See United States v. Speers, 382 U.S. 266, 275 (1965) (deciding that trustee in bankruptcy is judgment
creditor for purposes of priority over unrecorded federal tax lien); McCannon v. Marston, 679 F.2d 13,
16-17 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that word "knowledge" in Bankruptcy Code § 544 was not intended to
include "notice" and that trustee was subject to equitable lien of partner in Drake Hotel); See generally 5
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 541LH (1999) (describing history of various bankruptcy acts).
94 See Thomas J. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 850
(discussing historical mystery surrounding strong-arm power of trustees).
9' See Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961) (holding that security interest was
not voidable by bankruptcy trustee even though secured creditor recorded it four days after judgment
creditor had executed on property because no new credit had been extended in four-day gap period);
Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d 571, 574 (2d Cir. 1954) (stating that trustee could avoid mortgagee interest
if trustee can show that interest was unperfected as of date of bankruptcy). But see In re Federal's Inc.,
553 F.2d 509, 513 (6th Cir. 1977) (criticizing Harvey case as mistakenly creating "hypothetical super
creditor").
96 304 F.2d 224, 228 (9th Cir. 1962).
97 See id. at 228 (holding that § 70(c) does not vest trustee with rights of creditor holding lien on property
of bankrupt "in the absence of a creditor of the bankrupt who could have obtained a lien on such property");

1999]

REVISED UC.C ARTICLE 9: IMPACT IN BANKRUPTCY

Since 1978, Bankruptcy Code section 544(a) has empowered trustees in
bankruptcy to turn secured (but unperfected) creditors into unsecured creditors. 99
With respect to consensual security interests in personal property, this power is
measured by that of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor under state law.' 00 Since
1972, the relevant state law has been the current version of U.C.C. section 9301(1):
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an unperfected
security interest is subordinate to the rights of
(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security
interest is perfected. 01'
The U.C.C. does not provide a collective remedy; it operates on a case-by-case
basis to resolve conflicts between two creditors. 10 2 Bankruptcy Code section 544(a)
see also United Cal. Bank v. England, 371 F.2d 669, 671 (9th Cir. 1966) (stating that trustee has all powers
of creditors who actually exist and who could obtain liens against property); In re KOMFO Prods. Corp.,
247 F. Supp. 229, 233 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (noting that rights are determined by Bankruptcy Act but "initial
relationships are created and determined by state law").
98See 24 CONG. REc. HI 1089, 11097 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (Statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6456 (asserting that "in particular, § 544 overrules Pacific Finance.. .inso far
as [it held] that the trustee did not have the status of a creditor who extended credit immediately prior to the
commencement of the case"). The dispute regarding the extent of the trustee's avoiding powers has not been
completely resolved by Bankruptcy Code § 544(a) insofar as such powers pertain to certain real estate
transactions. See generally Richard L. Epling, Treatment of Land Sales Contracts Under the New

Bankruptcy Code, 56 AM BANKR. L. J. 55, 62-63 (1982) (discussing powers of trustee related to certain real
estate transact ion, namely powers to avoid unrecorded contracts to purchase real estate). Compare In re
Mill Concepts Corp., 123 B.R. 938, 944-46 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (asserting that although trustee now has
power to avoid transfers of interests in personal property regardless of whether actual creditor exists, trustee
still does not have power under Bankruptcy Code § 544(a)(3) to acquire or retain interest in real property
against claimant under constructive trust) with Mullins v. Paul J. Paradise & Assocs., Inc. (In re Paul J.
Paradise & Assocs., Inc.), 217 B.R. 452, 454 (Bankr. D. Del. 1997) (finding that Bankruptcy Code
§ 544(a)(3) confers status of bona fide purchaser upon trustee for all purposes). Constructive trusts in
personal property have also survived attacks by bankruptcy trustee. See, e.g., Kemp v. Bowen (In re
Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Western Pa.), 143 B.R. 633, 643-44 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (positing that under
Pennsylvania law, judgment and execution creditors are not protected against beneficiary of constructive
trust).
99See Moore v. Bay, 200 U.S. 4, 5 (1931) (announcing that mortgage which is adverse to creditors on
date of mortgage and those who thereafter became creditors between date of mortgage and date such
mortgage was recorded, do not get priority over those who became creditors after recordation of mortgage).
But see Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 364 U.S. 603, 607 (1961) (suggesting that creditors'
rights accrue at petition of bankruptcy and should not be cut off earlier).
'00See Smith v. Mark Twain Nat'l. Bank, 805 F.2d 278, 284-5 (8th Cir. 1986) (focusing on state law in
discussing powers of trustee regarding priority over debtors' deposits in creditor-bank); Bryant v. Secretary,
227 B.R189, 92 n. 26 (W.D. Va. 1998) (reasoning that defects in lien under state law are not cured and
avoidance of lien does not cure defect); Ledford v. Easy Living Furniture (In re Jackson), No. 3-84-00195,
1985 Bankr. Lexis 5341 at * 3 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio. Sept. 12, 1985) (noting that although federal law
provides trustee with strong arm powers, exercise of such powers is determined under state law).
'0' See U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (1972) (diminishing rights of lien creditor who acquires such lien without
knowledge of prior security interest and before such interest perfected).
'0'
See U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (understanding that usual scenario pits secured creditor whose claim to priority
is vulnerable against unsecured creditor who has become lien creditor and defining lien creditor as "a
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is the means by which unsecured creditors collectively may take advantage of the
priority rule of U.C.C. section0 9-301
(1)(b) because it incorporates the rule "whether
3
exists."
creditor
a
or not such
1. The Revised Priority Rule
Current U.C.C. section 9-301 will be replaced by Revised U.C.C. section 9317(a):
An unperfected security interest or agricultural lien is subordinate
to the rights of:
(2) a person that becomes a lien creditor before the earlier of
the time the security interest or agricultural lien is perfected or
a financing statement covering the collateral is filed.
Revised U.C.C. section 9-317(a) will impact bankruptcy cases in two ways, one
obvious, the other more subtle but far more significant. The straightforward effect
of Revised U.C.C. section 9-317(a) is to resolve the largely theoretical problem that
can arise in interpreting the interplay between current U.C.C. sections 9-301(1)(b)
and 9-203. Under current law, and notwithstanding the filing of a financing
statement, a security interest is not perfected until it has attached.'0 4 Attachment
does not take place until three events have occurred: 1) the debtor executes a
security agreement (or delivers possession), 2) the secured party gives value, and 3)
the debtor has rights in the collateral. 10 5 Thus, a lender who files a financing
statement describing its borrower's collateral on August 1, but who does not make
an advance until September 1, is subordinate to an unsecured creditor who procures
a judicial lien in the interim. °6 Revised Article 9 will reverse this relatively rare
creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy or the like and includes ... a
trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition "); see also Dick Warner Cargo Handling

Corp. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 700 F.2d 858, 861 (2d Cir. 1983) (balancing New York's version of U.C.C.
§ 9-301(4) with Connecticut garnishment law).
103 11 U.S.C. § 544; see also In re Boyertown Auto Body Works, No. 91-2075, 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis
17372 at * 10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 1991) (stating that "[u]nder Pennsylvania's priority rules, an unperfected
security interest is subordinate to the rights of a lien creditor. 13 Pa. C.S.A. § 9301(a)."); First Nat'l Bank
and Trust Co. v. Lasich (In re Three Lakes Cocktail Lounge and Restaurant, Inc.), 131 B.R. 70, 72
(Bankr. W.D. MI 1991) (stating that creditor's interest "is subordinate under M.S.A. 19.1301(l)(b) to the
Trustee's § 544(a)(1) status as judicial lien creditor").
'0o
See U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (stating that "[a] security interest is perfected when it has attached and when all
of the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken"); see also United States v. McDermott,
507 U.S. 447, 450-53 (1993) (holding that state-law lien was not first in time since it did not attach until
after federal lien was filed); E.F. Corp. v. Smith, 496 F.2d 826, 830 (10th Cir. 1974) (stating that attachment
cannot occur until "value is given").
'05See U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (1977) (stating that security interest is not enforceable and collateral does not
attach unless all three steps enumerated in U.C.C. § 9-203(1) are taken).
'06See id. § 9-301(lXb) (1972) (explaining "[A]n unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights
of... a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected."). Some courts have
imported equitable considerations into an otherwise straightforward exercise in statutory application to give
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result by making (the earlier of either perfection or filing) the date on which the
secured creditor gains priority over the holders of subsequent judicial liens.
This change should have little effect in bankruptcy cases. 0 7 It is rare that a
lender will, absent the protection of a financing order of the Bankruptcy Court
under section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code, make its first advance after a borrower's
bankruptcy filing. The bankruptcy trustee's power to avoid the grant of the security
interest only benefits unsecured creditors if the secured creditors have given value
to the debtor's estate. If creditors who have perfected their loan never make an
advance (due to the intervening bankruptcy), then the trustee's avoidance of the lien
is largely superfluous.
Revised Article 9 really impacts the avoidance powers of Bankruptcy Code
section 544(a) by enlarging the class of property subject to Article 9, and by
increasing the ease in perfecting security interests. Part I.B. of this Article
identified several aspects of Revised Article 9's impact. The following sections
will examine those factors as well as some others in more detail.
2. Revised Definition of Account
Revised Article 9's changes to the definition of "account" should have little
impact on bankruptcy cases. The primary source of the increase in the scope of
account in Revised U.C.C. section 9-102(a)(2) is the current category of general
intangibles.108 As long as a creditor has a properly perfected security interest in all
categories of assets under the current U.C.C., whether an item is properly classified
as an account or general intangible makes little difference outside the agricultural
context. 1°9 Both must be perfected by filing at the state level" 0 in the state of the
borrower's location. 1
the unperfected secured creditor priority over the holder of a judicial lien where the debtor has somehow
made it impossible for the secured creditor to perfect its interest. See, e.g., In re Einoder, 55 B.R. 319,
327-28 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) (finding that bank's unperfected security interest in land trust is subordinate
to trustee's powers); In re Trim-Lean Meat Products, 10 B.R. 333, 335 (D. Del. 1981) (holding that
financing company with unperfected lien is subordinate to trustee's power).
107 This is unlike Professor James J. White's proposal to eliminate any priority for judicial lien creditors
over unperfected secured creditors under current U.C.C. § 9-301(1), which would have substantially
reduced litigation under Bankruptcy Code § 544(a) (emphasis added). See James J.White, Revising Article
9 To Reduce Wasteful Litigation,26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 823, 842 (1993).
'08 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-102 Official Cmt. 5a (1999) (noting that "[m]any categories.. .classified as
general intangibles under former Article 9 are accounts under this Article."); see also Wasserman v.
Alexander (In re Drapery Design Ctr., Inc.), 86 B.R. 120, 124 n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (recognizing
that U.C.C. § 9-102 includes security interests created in general tangibles or accounts);. Carl S. Bjerre,
Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants, Property and Perfection, 84 CORNELL
L. REV. 305, 392 n.351 (1999) (noting that U.C.C. § 9-102(l) had "heretofore applied" to sales of accounts
and chattel paper, but not to general intangibles).
'09
See generally Revised U.C.C. § 9-101 Cmt. 4d (1999) (stating that in most cases security interest may
be perfected by control or filing whereas agricultural liens may only be perfected by filing).
Ho See U.C.C. § 9-401 (1972) (stating that filing must be either with official in prescribed county or with
secretary of state); see also J.D. Court, Inc. v. U.S., 712 F.2d 258, 259 (1983) (noting that party perfected
his security interest by filing with Illinois Secretary of State pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-401); First Nat'l Bank
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3. Sales of Payment Intangibles and Promissory Notes
Revised Article 9 creates a new subcategory of general intangibles, the
payment intangible," 2 as well as a new subcategory of instruments, the promissory
note. 1 3 Payment intangibles are general intangibles where the principal obligation
of the obligor is the payment of money.1 4 Payment intangibles are not instruments,
15
which are characterized by either negotiability or assignability by indorsement.
Examples of payment intangibles include loan agreements or commercial debt
instruments that typically contain too many covenants to constitute an instrument 16
and are usually sold or participated, not negotiated. Promissory notes have, of
course, existed for centuries and are now separately categorized to permit their sale
by a holder who retains a security interest to defeat bankruptcy trustees without
Trust v. First Nat'l Bank of Greybull, 582 F.2d 524, 526 (1978) (observing that bank initially perfected
security interest by filing with Montana Secretary of State, but interest not perfect where filed improperly
with county clerk's office).
.. See U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(b) (stating that perfection is governed by law of jurisdiction where debtor is
located). Revised Article 9 will virtually eliminate perfection by filing at the local level. See Revised U.C.C.
§ 9-501 Official Cmt. 2 (1999) (stating that local filing increases costs associated with such filing and
central filing is to be done in most situations). Alternatives 2 and 3 to U.C.C. § 9-401(1) will no longer
exist, thus eliminating the special subcategories of agricultural equipment as well as accounts and general
intangibles arising out of the same of farm products. See id (providing filing option for agricultural lien or
security interest). "Farm Products" will still exist. See id § 9-102(34) (listing "[g]oods, other than standing
timber, with respect to which the debtor is engaged in farming."). However, perfection in "farm products"
will also be at the state level. See id. § 9-501 Official Cmt. 2. Only as-extracted minerals, timber, and
fixtures will continue to be perfected by filing at the local level. See id § 9-501(aXl)(Xa), (b) (stating that
these interests must be filed in office where mortgage on related property would be filed).
112See Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(aX61) (1999) (defining payment intangible as "general intangible under
which the account debtor's principal obligation is monetary obligation"); see also U.C.C. § 9-106
(defining general intangible as "personal property...other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents,
instruments, investment property, rights to proceeds of written letters of credit, and money.").
113See Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(aX65) (stating "'Promissory note' means an instrument that evidences a
promise to pay a monetary obligation, does not evidence an order to pay, and does not contain an
acknowledgment by a bank"); id. § 9-102(a)(65) Official Cmt. 5c (stating that definition of promissory note
is "new"); U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (stating that negotiable instrument is unconditional promise to pay money).
14 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-102 Official Cmt. 5d (1999) (noting that payment intangible is "subset"
of
general intangibles where "account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation") (emphasis added
in original); discussion supra note 113 (noting requirements for negotiable instruments under U.C.C.
§ 3-104(a)).
...
See id. § 9-102(aX47) (explaining "'Instrument' means (i) a negotiable instrument or (ii) any other
writing that evidences a right to the payment of a monetary obligation, is not itself a security agreement or
lease, and is of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any necessary
indorsement or assignment."); see also Tompkins Printing Equip. Co. v. Almik, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 918, 920
(E.D. Mich. 1989) (stating that there may be assignments of portion of debt evidenced by negotiable
instrument); Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Frymire, 1991 WL 274972, at *3 (N.D. I11. 1991)
(noting that negotiable instruments are convenient tangible alternatives to money).
116See Revised U.C.C. §9-104 (aX 1), (2), (3) (stating that negotiable instrument is conditional promise to
pay fixed amount that is payable to bearer or holder, payable on demand or specified time, and does not
contain any covenants beyond duty to pay); see, e.g., Yin v. Society Nat. Bank Indiana, 665 N.E.2d 58, 62-3
(Ind. App. 1996), reh. denied, transfer denied 683 N.E.2d 581 (1997) (agreeing line of credit was not
"negotiable instrument" within meaning of U.C.C. where debtor could make draws of varying amounts upon

line of credit).
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perfection by filing or possession. Revised Article 9 improves the position of
purchasers of interests in payment intangibles or promissory notes as well as loan
participants in the event that the lead lender or seller becomes insolvent. The
purchaser of a payment intangible (or loan participant) is deemed to have a security
interest in the written evidence of the underlying obligation that is automatically
perfected, even though the loan agreement or promissory note remains in the
possession of the lead lender or seller.1 7 Automatic attachment and perfection will
defeat the claim of the bankruptcy trustee under Bankruptcy Code section 544(a),
even though the automatic security interest of a purchaser of a promissory note is
subordinate to the8 security interest of another creditor who has possession of the
same instrument."
4. Health-Care-Insurance Receivables and Commercial Tort Claims
The addition of health-care-insurance receivables and commercial tort claims
may significantly reduce the assets available for unsecured creditors in the event of
bankruptcy. The use of health care receivables as primary collateral has
historically faced two stumbling blocks. First, the majority of the health care
account debtors are either insurance companies or government programs." 9 Under
the current version of the U.C.C., insurance proceeds are not available as primary
collateral. 20 Second, Congress has enacted a series of anti-assignment provisions
designed to prevent factoring of the health care payables it generates.121
117 See Revised U.C.C.

§§

9-109(a)(3), 9-309(3)-(4) (noting security interests in sale of payment

intangibles and sale of promissory notes are perfected when they attach.); see id.§ 9-309(3), Official Cmt. 3
(noting that filing is not necessary to perfect purchase money security interest in consumer goods);
id.§ 9-309(4), Official Cmt. 4 (providing perfection automatically, to certain assignments of payment
intangibles and accounts); see generally, Reade H. Ryan, Jr., Revised U.C.C. Article 9 - Letters of Credit
and Deposit Accounts, ALI-ABA Course Study 81, 86 (1999) (observing application of Article 9).
" See Revised U.C.C. § 9-330(d) (stating that same priority rule does not apply in case of payment
intangible in which case priority of purchaser/participant cannot be subordinated even by another secured
creditor); see also Linda J. Rusch, Farm Financing Under Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 211,
248 n.244 (1999) (observing that Revised Article 9 no longer distinguishes "claiming the instrument as
mere proceeds and claiming the instrument as more than mere proceeds" when dealing with instruments);
Smith, supra note 36, at 27 (stating that Revised § 9-330(d) places priority on secured party if possession
taken with good faith, value, and without knowledge).
119For example, Medicare and Medicaid payments comprise 45% of the average hospital's receivables and
80% or more of the income for nursing homes. See Patrick A. Guida, Lessons in Fitting Your Square
Collateral Into The UCC's Round Hole, ALI-ABA Course Study 159, 206 (1998). Other programs
sponsored by the government include the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services
("CHAMPUS"), the Civilian Health and Medical Program of Veterans Affairs ("CHAMPVA"), and the
Veterans' Administration ("VA"); see id.at 207; see also James T. Markus & John F. Young, Intensive
Care: Anti-discrimination Provisions - Do They Have Any Real Meaning?, 1998 ABt JNL. LEXIS 74, at * 1
(stating that health care industry has changed such that "an increasing portion of healthcare provider
revenues are derived from participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs").
120See supra Part I.B. I (discussing broadened scope of Revised Article 9 as related to collateral).
121 See

Social Security Amendments of 1972 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395g(c) (1994) and 42 U.S.C.

§ 1396a(aX32) (1994)) and the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-fraud and Abuse Amendments to the Social
Security Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395g (c) (1994)); see also H.R. REP. No. 92-231 (1972) reprinted in
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The alternative of securitization of health care receivables 122 has proven
inadequate as a means of financing health care providers for another reason. In
general, health care receivables are widely dispersed across a large number of
hospitals, clinics, labs, and doctors' offices.
Revised U.C.C. section 9-102(a)(46) should enable traditional lenders to make
advances to borrowers on account of health care receivables due from insurers like
any other account. 123 State law, however, cannot overcome the anti-assignment
provisions of federal law. Presumably in recognition of this fact, the blanket
preclusion of the effect of anti-assignment language by account debtors consistently
excludes health care receivables. 24 This exclusion will continue to prevent
effective use of payments under Medicare, Medicaid and similar federal health
insurance programs as primary collateral.
In the case of non-governmental insurers, however, an anti-assignment
provision is ineffective to prevent attachment or perfection of a security interest in a
health care receivable. 125 The very next subsection, Revised U.C.C. section 9408(d), however, relieves the health care account debtor from virtually every
obligation to the secured creditor. Thus, the net effect of a security interest in a
health care receivable from a private insurer containing an anti-assignment clause is
simply to eliminate the power of the bankruptcy
trustee to avoid the security
26
interest for the benefit of unsecured creditors.
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 5090; H.R. REP. No. 95-393 (1972) reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039,
3051-52 (focusing on purpose for 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(32)).
122 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing "health-care-insurance receivables").
123 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(aX46) (1999) (defining "health-care-insurance receivable" to be "an
interest in or claim under a policy of insurance which is a right to payment of a monetary obligation for
health-care goods or services provided"); id.§ 9-109(dX8) (indicating that article does not apply to transfer
or assignment of claim under insurance policy involving non-health care insurance receivable);
Smith, supra note 36, at 6 (stating that Revised Article 9 coverage includes "assignments of insurance
claims as original collateral").
124
See U.C.C. §§ 9-404(e), 9-405(d), 9-406(i) (making corresponding section inapplicable to health-careinsurance receivable); Jason M. Ban, Deposit Accounts: An Article 9 Security Interest, 17 ANN. REv.
BANKING L. 493, 526 (1998) (noting Revised Article 9 deposit accounts replaced pledge and assignment);
Nation, supranote 5, at 214 (stating that Revised Article 9 would specifically include "security interest in
non-assignable general intangibles").
125 See U.C.C. § 9-408(c) (explaining that "[a] rule of law, statute, or regulation that prohibits, restricts, or
requires the consent of... an account debtor to the assignment or transfer of, or creation of a security interest
in a promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable is ineffective to the extent that the rule of law, statute
or regulation would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest.").
126 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-408, Official Cmt. 6 (revealing intent of drafters). This
comment states:
Subsections (a) and (c) affect two classes of persons. These subsections affect account
debtors on . . . health-care-insurance receivables . . . . Subsection (c) also affects
governmental entities that enact or determine rules of law. However, subsection (d)
ensures that these affected persons are not affected adversely. That provision removes
any burdens or adverse effects on these persons for which any rational basis could exist
to restrict the effectiveness of an assignment or to exercise any remedies. For this
reason, the effects of subsections (a) and (c) are immaterial insofar as those persons are
concerned.
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The addition of commercial tort claims to the quiver of Article 9 collateral is
more straightforward. Current Article 9 excludes all tort claims from the ambit of
its coverage on the ground that tort claims "do not usually serve as commercial
collateral."1 27 The exclusion of tort claims from Article 9 never meant that they
could not serve as collateral for a loan. Rather, the creation, attachment and
perfection of a lien on a tort claim were left to non-uniform state law. 28 Revised
29
Article 9 will standardize the resolution of these matters on a national scale.
There are, however, three substantial restrictions on the creation of a security
interest in commercial tort claims. First, the claim must fit the definition of a
commercial tort claim. 30 Second, the claim must be described in the security
agreement with some specificity.13 ' A generic reference to "all commercial tort
claims" would be insufficient. The degree of specificity required, however, is
rather low. "A description such as 'all tort claims arising out of the explosion of
debtor's factory' would suffice."' 32 Even this limited degree of identification would
Id. (emphasis added); see also Paul M. Shupack, Making Revised Article 9 Safe for Securitizations: A Brief
History, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 167, 177-78 (1999) (observing relationship between Revised U.C.C. § 9-406
and Revised § 9-408(d)). Although Revised § 9-408(d) appears to restrict Revised § 9-406(d), the resulting
effect maintains the rights of the account debtor. See id. at 178 n.55 (asserting similarity between Revised
Article 9 and Federal Communications Commission's handling of broadcast licenses); In re Cheskey,
9 F.C.C.R. 986, 987 (1994) (holding that FCC approval is required before transfer of license).
127 U.C.C. § 9-104, Official Cmt. 8. See Barclays Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Four Winds Plaza Partnership,
938 F. Supp. 304, 308 (D.V.I. 1996) (opining § 9-104 excludes transfer of tort claims not exclusion of tort
settlement proceeds); Sicherman v. Falkenberg (In re Falkenberg), 136 BR. 481, 485 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1992) (stating U.C.C. § 9-104 does not include insurance policy claims or tort claims). See generally
Harold R. Weinberg, They Came From "Beyond The Pale". Security Interests in Tort Claims, 83 KY. L.J.
443,449 (1994-1995) (discussing significance of including and excluding tortclaims as collateral in Article
9 and stating that inclusion is better choice).
128See Janger, supra note 30, at 626-27 (asserting that "state[s] could adopt a priority for tort claimants
through a statutory lien, akin to a mechanic's lien, that would have priority over an Article 9 lien" but
concluding that such non-uniform state laws would not offer solution because collective action problems
and state competition would seriously impair state law efforts to legislate in favor of tort claimant priority).
129See Revised U.C.C. § 9-109 (d) (12) (applying Article 9 to commercial tort claims); supra notes 40-41
and accompanying text (discussing treatment of commercial tort claims as collateral under Revised
Article 9); see also Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full
PriorityDebates, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1373, 1389 (1997) (noting that Article 9 full priority disadvantages
tort creditors).
30 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(13):
Commercial Tort claim means a claim arising in tort with respect to which:
(A) the claimant is an organization; or
(B) the claimant is an individual and the claim:
(i) arose in the course of the claimant's business or profession; and
(ii) does not include damages arising out of personal injury to or the death of
an individual.
Id. However, if the tort claim is settled, thereby becoming a contractual settlement, a claim can no longer
arise in tort. See Revised U.C.C. § 9-109 Official Cmt. 15 (indicating also that right to payment turns into
payment intangible).
131See Revised U.C.C. § 9-108 (eX) (1999) (stating "[a] description only by type of collateral defined in
the U.C.C. is an insufficient description of a commercial tort claim").
13 Id. § 9-108 Official Cmt. 5.
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be unnecessary in the financing statement in which a simple reference to all assets
or all personal
property would be sufficient even with respect to commercial tort
133
claims.

Third, a security interest in commercial tort claims may not attach to newly
arising claims by virtue of an after-acquired property clause in the security
agreement. 34 This limitation is a corollary to the requirement that the commercial
tort claim be described in the security agreement. It is not clear whether the
definition of commercial tort claim in the Revised U.C.C. is as broad as the
definition of "claim" in the Bankruptcy Code. 135 In other words, can a debtor grant
a security interest in an unmatured, contingent commercial tort claim? While the
Revised U.C.C. does not have a definition of "claim," its definition of "commercial
tort claim" uses the present participle "arising," not the past participle "has arisen":
"(13) 'Commercial tort claim' means a claim arising in tort .. .,,'(Emphasis
added). This suggests that a security interest could attach to a sufficiently
described but still unmatured and contingent claim. On the other hand, Official
Comment 4 to Revised U.C.C. section 9-204 states that "[i]n order for a security
interest in a tort claim to attach, the claim must be in existence when the security
agreement is authenticated." Is an unmatured and contingent tort claim "in
existence?" The answer may well be yes for bankruptcy purposes, 37 but litigation
may be necessary for a resolution of this issue under Revised Article 9.
The effect of increasing the pool of potential collateral to include commercial
tort claims will certainly be to lessen their availability to unsecured creditors in
bankruptcy cases. The three limits described above will reduce the collateralization
of claims but the primary areas of attack on the use of commercial tort claims as
collateral will involve sufficiency of description in the security agreement and
avoidance under Bankruptcy Code section 547. Under Revised Article 9,
commercial lenders may routinely demand representations from prospective
borrowers describing all potential commercial tort claims. Similar certificates will
also be required from current borrowers listing any such newly arising claims.
Inclusion of commercial tort claims in the security agreement for preexisting
113See id.§ 9-504 (2) (asserting that "[a] financing statement sufficiently indicates the collateral that it
covers only if the financing statement provides . . . an indication that the financing statement covers all

assets or all personal property").
114 See id.§ 9-204 (b) (2) (1999) (observing that "[a] security interest
does not attach under a term
constituting an after-acquired property clause to... a commercial tort claim").
' See Revised U.C.C. § 9-102 (a) (13) (explaining definition of commercial tort claim); 11 U.S.C.
§ 101 (5) (1994) (defining "claim").
136See Revised U.C.C. § 9-102 (a) (13) (exemplifying use of "arising" in present participle in definition of
tort claim).
117Compare Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332, 337
(3d Cir. 1984) (advocating narrowly accrued state law claim theory) with Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839
F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 1988) (articulating broad conduct test theory) and Epstein v. Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors of the Estate of Piper Aircraft Corp. (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573, 157778 (11 th Cir. 1995) (describing "middle of the road" relationship test).

1999]

REVISED UC.C ARTICLE 9: IMPACT IN BANKRUPTCY

claims, and amendments of existing security agreements to include such claims as
they arise, may take place regularly. Unless the perfunctory transfer of a security
interest in commercial tort claims can be set aside as a preference, the trustee will
have no power to avoid it.
5. Perfection by Dominion: Possession or Control
Courts historically preferred possession by the secured creditor as the method
of perfection.' Debtors' practical need to continue to possess collateral they had
financed during the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries prompted creation
of new non-possessory methods of perfection such as chattel mortgages.' 39 Yet
even after the enactment of the current U.C.C., a substantial place remained for
perfection by pledge and delivery of possession of collateral.' 40 Unfortunately,
current Article 9 failed to define possession. Litigation has thus abounded,
especially over the questions of custody, by whom, and what
extent of dominion
4'
perfection.'
constitute
to
"possession"
sufficient
amounts to
The scope of perfection by possession was expanded and modified in 1994 to
make Article 9 consistent with the revisions to Article 8 of the U.C.C. Article 8 was
substantially modified in that year to reflect the reality of modem indirect holdings
of securities. 42 The conforming amendments to Article 9 permitted perfection of a
security interest in investment property by the exercise of "control."' 143 The
category of investment property includes securities for which physical possession is
either impossible or impracticable. 144 A secured creditor can achieve the requisite
138See In re Richman, 181 B.R. 260, 266 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995) (stating that U.C.C. requires secured
party obtain possession in order to perfect security interest); In re Kontaratos, 10 B.R. 956, 961
(Bankr. D. Me. 1981) (asserting that U.C.C. requires possession by secured creditor to perfect security
interest); In re Ault, 6 B.RI 58, 64 (Bankr. C.D. Tenn. 1980) (reasoning that security interests depend on
possession of goods and when possession is relinquished, security interest becomes unperfected).
139
See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 35
(2d ed. 1987) (providing analysis of history of pre-U.C.C. methods of perfection).
140See id.(discussing non-possessing methods of perfection).
"'1See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-304 (1) & 9-305 (1995) (noting that security interest in goods, instruments,
money, negotiable documents, or chattel paper may be perfected by secured party's taking possession of
collateral). The secured party may perfect a security interest in the right to proceeds of a written letter of
credit by the taking possession of the letter of credit. See also Norwest Bank v. Bergquist (In re Rolain),
823 F. 2d 198, 199 (8th Cir. 1987) (utilizing test set forth in U.C.C. § 9-305); In re Prescott, 805 F. 2d 719,
730 (7th Cir. 1986) (same); Lovett v. Schuster, 633 F. 2d 98, 105 (8th Cir. 1980) (stating that perfection of
security interest is complete upon secured party's possession of instrument).
142See In re Rolain, 823 F.2d at 200 (finding debtor's attorney to be valid bailee/agent of creditor, and
thus, creditor had perfected security interest in note); see also In re Copeland, 531 F.2d 1195, 1202
(3d Cir. 1976) (opining that lender's security interest in certain shares of stock placed in escrow are
perfected upon delivery of such stock to escrow agent or debtor's attorney).
143
See In re Kontaratos, 10 B.R. 956, 961 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981) (observing changes that Article 8 has
made to treatment of investment securities); James Gadsden & Austin D. Keyes, Revised Article 8 of the
Uniform Commercial Code: Investment Securities, 115 BANKING L.J. 346, 346 (1998) (considering major
changes to treatment of investment securities made in 1994 revisions to Article 8 of Uniform Commercial
Code).
'" See U.C.C. § 9-115 (1994) (discussing importance of control with regard to perfecting security
interest). With the increased role that control will play under Revised Article 9, I have coined the usage
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control over an item of investment property within a three-party agreement among
the debtor, the securities intermediary and the secured party. 145 The agreement
would provide that the debtor and the intermediary agree that the latter will transfer
the security, or any value in the securities account to the secured creditor, without
further consent
by the debtor. 146 Execution of such an agreement would constitute
47
perfection. 1

Of greater significance in bankruptcy cases was another 1994 amendment,
which provided that by filing, a security interest in investment property could be
perfected.148 Even though a security interest perfected by filing will always be
subordinate to one perfected by control, it will still defeat an unperfected security
interest,149 for example, a judicial lien creditor (and bankruptcy trustee).
Revised Article 9 discusses a secured creditors perfection through dominion in
two ways. First, it sets out in great detail how a person other than the secured party
"dominion" to describe both perfection by control and traditional possession. See, e.g. Charles W. Mooney,
Jr., et al., An introduction to the Revised UC.C.Article 8 and Review of other Recent Developments with
Investment Securities, 49 BuS. LAW. 1891, 1897 (1994) (explaining two special rules that apply if party to
transaction is securities intermediary); Adam B. Strauss, Reviewing Revised Article 8 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 44 WAYNE L. REv. 203, 214 (1998) (discussing Article 9 and "control" as being key
innovation for perfecting security interest).
145 See U.C.C. § 9-115 (1) (f)
(defining "investment property" to mean: (i) security whether certificated or
uncertificated; (ii) security entitlement; (iii) securities account; (iv) commodity contract; or (v) commodity
account); see also Scott E. Nutter & Bryan T. Pratt, A Practitioners'Guide to Revised Articles 5 and 8 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 63 Mo. L. REv. 325, 335 (1998) (defining investment property and'
discussing differences between its treatment under Article 8 and Article 9 of U.C.C.). But see In re U.S.
Physicians, Inc., 236 B.R. 593, 602 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.) (1999) (finding purpose and effect of § 9-115 to be
only understood in coordination with definitions found elsewhere in U.C.C. and that it is necessary to
examine other sections to understand what exactly constitutes "investment property").
146See Revised U.C.C. § 9-102 (a)(3) (defining "[a]ccount debtor" to be person obligated on account,
chattel paper, or general intangible, and excluding persons obligated to pay negotiable instruments even if
instrument constitutes part of chattel paper); see also id.§ 9-102 (a) (72) (A) (defining "secured party" to be
person in whose favor a security interest is created or provided for under a security agreement, whether or
not any obligation to be secured is outstanding); U.C.C § 8-102 (14) (1994) (defining "securities
intermediary" to mean: (i) clearing corporation; or (ii) person, including bank or broker, that in ordinary
course of its business maintains securities accounts for others and is acting in that capacity).
147See U.C.C. § 9-115 (4) (a) ("A security interest in investment property may be perfected by control.");
see also In re Keene Corp., 188 B.R. 881, 889 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1995) (discussing that Revised Article 8 of
U.C.C. does not require written security agreement by debtor to secure interest).
148 See U.C.C. § 9-115 (4) (b) (1994) (noting that except as otherwise provided in this
section security
interest in investment property may be perfected by filing); see also In re U.S. Physicians, Inc.,
236 B.R at 602 (determining that security interest in investment property may generally be perfected either
by control or by filing financial statement). But see Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank,
1993 WL 300999, *2-3 (10th Cir. August 2, 1993) (detailing problems that arise when perfection of
security interests in personal property occur through filing).
149 See U.C.C. § 9-115 Official Cmt. 5 (stating "perfection by filing is intended to affect only general
creditors or other secured creditors who rely on filing"). But see U.C.C. § 9-115 Official Cmt. 4 (stating that
"although filing is a permissible method of perfection, a secured party who perfects by filing takes the risk
that the debtor has granted or will grant a security interest in the same property to anther party who obtains
control."). See generally Brown & Root, Inc. v. Hempstead County Sand & Gravel, Inc., 767 F.2d 464, 469
(8th Cir. 1985) (allowing bank, which failed to file financing statement, to retain priority over subsequent
judgment lien based upon state law, as opposed to Uniform Commercial Code).
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achieves perfection through possession.150 Second, it greatly expands the collateral
but also deposit accounts, letter-of-credit
to include not only investment securities,
5'
paper.'
chattel
electronic
rights, and
The newly created ability of a secured creditor to perfect a security interest in
deposit accounts will have the greatest impact in bankruptcy cases. The PEB Study
Report recommended that Article 9 be revised to allow all deposit accounts to serve
as primary collateral. 52 Subsequently, the Drafting Committee modified Article 9
to exclude only consumer deposit accounts and also required the consent of the
depository institution to the pledge of a non-consumer account. 5 3 Still, under the
current version of Article 9, deposit accounts maintained by a secured creditor
bank, generally function as primary collateral by virtue of either a common law
bankers' lien or pursuant to the common law right of set-off.154 The ability of a nonRevised U.C.C. § 9-313 (c) (1999):
With respect to collateral other than certificated securities and goods covered by a
document, a secured party takes possession of collateral in the possession of a person
other than the debtor when (1) the person in possession authenticates a record
acknowledging that it holds possession of the collateral for the secured party's benefit
or (2) the person takes possession of the collateral after having authenticated a record
acknowledging that it will hold possession of collateral for the secured party's benefit.
See In re Copeland, 531 F.2d 1195, 1204 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding that in pre-amendment time, possession of
collateral does not have to be by individual under sole dominion and control of secured party so long as it
adequately informs potential lenders of perfected security interest); see also Strauss, supranote 144, at 215
(addressing importance of "super-priority" rule for debtor's own intermediary in defeating secured parties
with control, but questioning limitations of rule in practice).
"' See Revised U.C.C. § 9-314 (a) (stating "A security interest in investment property, deposit accounts,
letter-of-credit rights, or electronic chattel paper may be perfected by control of the collateral.").
See generally Reade H. Ryan, Jr., Revised UC.C. Article 9-Letters of Credit and Deposit Accounts,
ALI.-ABA Course Study 81, 83 (1999) (addressing significant changes that Article 9 has made affecting
security interests in letters of credit and deposit accounts); Edwin E. Smith, Sample Form of Revised U CC.
Article 9 (1998) Deposit Account "ControlAgreement" with Commentary, 30 ALI-ABA 327, 329 (1998)
(providing sample forms and function of attaching security interest in deposit accounts).
152 See Smith, supra note 151, at 329 (giving examples of sample forms); see also Parker v. Community
First Bank, 123 F.3d 1243, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 1997) (demonstrating how California rejected U.C.C.'s deposit
account exclusion in order to cover field of secured transactions and personal property). See generally
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Van Kylen, 98 BR. 455, 461 (Bankr. W. D. Wis. 1989)
(holding that security interest granted to bank in cash management account established by debtor and
spouse with their investment broker was not excepted from article nine as security interest in "deposit
account").
' Compare U.C.C. § 9-104 (1) (stating "[t]his Article does not apply ... to a transfer of an interest in any
deposit account") with Revised U.C.C. § 9-109 (d) (13) (stating"[t]his article does not apply to . . . an
assignment of a deposit account in a consumer transaction"). See generally Jason M. Ban, Deposit
L. 493, 495-99 (1998)
Accounts: An Article 9 Security Interest, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING
(comparing common law, present U.C.C. and Revised U.C.C. and offering reasons for change in present
law); Ryan, supranote 151, at 91 (discussing differences between current Article 9 and Revised Article 9 in
their treatment of deposit accounts).
'54 See Dwight L. Greene, Deposit Accounts As Bank Loan CollateralBeyond Setoff To Perfection-- The
Common Law Is Alive And Well, 39 DRAKE L. REv. 259, 264 (1989/1990) (arguing that deposit account
financing is just another form of private bargained for debt collateralization and should be accommodated by
common law and given parity with Article 9 perfected security interests). See generally Zions First Nat'l
Bank v. Christiansen Bros. Inc., 66 F.3d 1560, 1564-65 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding bank's perfected security
'50
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bank lender or a bank whose debtor customer maintains a deposit account at
another institution to perfect a security interest in the account is dependent upon
being able to show that the traceable funds in the account were proceeds of
collateral. 155 Lenders in such situations made use of special depository or lockbox
agreements under which they fared tolerably well. 156 Nonetheless, the power to use
commercial deposit accounts as primary collateral will certainly not make
additional assets available to unsecured creditors in the event of bankruptcy. Such
security interest may be perfected by "control" without the necessity of filing a
financing statement. 57 The requisite control can be achieved automatically by the
debtor's maintenance of an account with the lender bank 15 or through a three-party
agreement comparable to those used in connection with investment securities.' 59
The priority of the right of set off over a security interest in a deposit account is
another indication that the chief target of the provisions of Revised Article 9
regarding deposit accounts are unsecured creditors and their representative, the
bankruptcy trustee. Consistent with the current Article 9, rights of recoupment and

interest in subcontractor's accounts receivable to be subordinate to general contractor's right to set off funds
it paid subcontractor's supplier to remove mechanics' lien against amount it owed subcontractor); Janet A.
Flaccus, Banks Against Secured Parties: To the Victor Go the Spoils, 6 U. MIAMI BUS. L.J. 59, 59 (1997)

(analyzing priority disputes between bank with secured lines of credit and creditor with security interest in
proceeds that pass through bank).
'SSSee Flaccus, supra note 154, at 90 (discussing creditors' ability to perfect security interest in deposit
account in another institution; see also Capital Tracing Co. v. Interstate Stores, Inc., 830 F.2d 16, 19
(2d Cir. 1987) (applying common law principles as opposed to U.C.C. where bank claimed security interest
in operating account maintained by debtor at different bank).
156 But see General Elec. Co. v. Halmar Distribs., Inc., 968 F.2d 121, 128-29 (1st Cir. 1992)
(discussing whether security interest in proceeds expires when it passes into lockbox controlled by bank);
Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd., v. Allnet Communication Servs., Inc., No. 94C700, 1997 WL 106132, *1-3
(N.D. I11.Feb. 10, 1997) (discussing problems associated with lockbox agreement and possibility that
creditor may gain priority while agreement is in place); Petron Trading Co., Inc. v. Hydrocarbon Trading &
Transp. Co., 663 F.Supp 1153, 1159 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (discussing example of pitfalls of lockbox financing).
117 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-314 (a) (explaining "[a] security interest in [a] ...
deposit account may be
perfected by control."); see also P.A. Bergner Co. v. Bank One, 140 F.3d 1111, 1121 (7th Cir. 1998)
(determining whether Wisconsin would recognize common law security interest in deposit account along
with whether such security interest is perfected by bank's assumption. of control over account);
Jefferson Bank & Trust v. United States, 894 F.2d 1241, 1242-44 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that bank had
perfected security interest in its customer's accounts because bank had control and continually monitored
monies in accounts and could have prevented withdrawal, rendering Government's tax lien junior and
inferior to bank's security interest).
158See Revised U.C.C. § 9-104(a)(1) (1999). (stating "[a] secured party has control of a deposit account if
the secured party is the bank with which the deposit account is maintained."). See generally Reade H.
Ryan, Jr., Trade Receivables Purchases 71 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 305, 309 (1999) (citing Revised Article 9 in
relation to loans secured by receivables); Steven 0. Weise, UC.C. Article 9- Personal Property Secured
Transactions, 47 Bus. LAW. 1593, 1598 (1992) (discussing perfecting of security interests in passbook
accounts maintained at bank).
'9 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-104(aX2) (stating "a secured party has control of a deposit account if the
debtor, secured party, and bank have agreed in an authenticated record that the bank will comply with
instructions originated by the secured party directing disposition of the funds in the account without further
consent of the debtor"); see also supra text accompanying notes 121-122.
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set off are still excluded from coverage under the Revised Article.'6r However,
Revised Article 9 specifically provides that a bank with the right of set off against a
deposit account has priority over a lender with a security interest in that deposit
account. 16' The care to continue observing the commercial lending practice coupled
with the ease of perfecting a security interest in a commercial deposit account make
it all the less likely that there will be any unencumbered funds available in
bankruptcy cases.
6.

Perfection by Filing: Expansion of Scope

Perhaps the most significant reduction in the trustee's avoiding powers effected
by Revised Article 9 is increasing the number of categories of collateral in which a
security interest may be perfected by filing. Previously, Part I.B.3. addressed the
Drafting Committee's decision to permit perfection of a security interest in
instruments by filing a financing statement.' 62 The failure of a secured party to
perfect by obtaining possession of instruments as required under current U.C.C.
section 9-304(1) has certainly provided ample fodder for the trustee's avoiding
powers under Bankruptcy Code section 544(a). 163 The ability to perfect by simple
filing under Revised U.C.C. section 9-312(a) will thus reduce assets available to
unsecured creditors.
However, the Drafting Committee did not wish to upset settled commercial
practice under which possession still remains the primary means of perfection of
security interests in instruments. Not only does possession without filing still
remain a legitimate means of perfection, 64 but one who obtains possession has
priority over a secured creditor who perfected its security interest in an instrument
only by filing. 65 Therefore, the principal significance of permitting perfection by
'60See Revised U.C.C. § 9-109 (d) (10) (stating "[t]his article does not apply to... a right of recoupmerit
or set-off."); see also U.C.C. § 9-104 (i) (stating that article does not apply to right of set-off).
161See Revised U.C.C. §9-109, -104.
62
1 See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
163
See In re Sprint Mortgage Bankers Corp., 164 B.RI 224, 229 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994) affd, 177 B.R. 4

(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (concluding that trustee had rights superior to those of putative secured creditors
because creditors failed to obtain possession of notes); see also In re Churchill Mortgage Inv. Corp.,
233 B.R.61, 70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (granting trustee's motion to sell mortgaged property over objection
of putative secured creditor/investor who had failed to obtain possession of mortgage and note);
Stockschlaeder & McDonald v. Kittay (In re Stockbridge Funding Corp.), 145 B.R. 797, 808
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) affd in part and vacated in part, 158 B.R. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that to
perfect interest in mortgage assignment assignee must possess note).
'64See Revised U.C.C. § 9-313 (a) (1999) ("Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a secured
party may perfect a security interest in negotiable documents, goods, instruments, money or tangible chattel
paper by taking possession of the collateral.").
165
See Revised U.C.C. § 9-330 (d) (stating "Except as otherwise provided in § 9-331(a), a purchaser of an
instrument has priority over a security interest in the instrument perfected by a method other than possession
if the purchaser gives value and takes possession of the instrument in good faith and without knowledge that
the purchase violates the rights of the secured party."). This result may not be readily apparent because the
statute speaks in terms of a conflict between a party who perfected by filing and a purchaser of the
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filing instruments is not to change the relative rights of secured creditors, but to
make it uncomplicated for any secured creditor to defeat a bankruptcy trustee by
simply including the category of "instruments" in its security agreement and filing
an "all assets" financing statement.
B

Proceeds Under Bankruptcy Code § 552(a)

Thus far we have considered the impact of the changes effected by Revised
Article 9 on what is subject to a security interest at the outset of the bankruptcy
case. Expansion of the scope of Article 9 and increased ease of perfection combine
to reduce the ability of the bankruptcy trustee to pry assets loose from security
interests. What effect will Revised Article 9 have on property that security
interests would otherwise attach after the case is commenced?
1. Value Enhancement Under the U.C.C.
The current version of the U.C.C. made two substantial advances over previous
uniform statutes and the common law in the means by which a secured creditor
could reach property that did not exist when its debtor executed the security
agreement. U.C.C. section 9-204 validated provisions in a security agreement that
extend the reach of collateral to after-acquired property.' 66 This represented a major
victory for freedom of contract in general (and secured creditors in particular) in
the face of continued judicial antipathy to the concept of the floating lien.' 67 At the
same time, current U.C.C. section 9-306(2) 68
automatically extends a security interest
collateral.1
described
any
of
to the proceeds
2.

Bankruptcy Code Limitations

Notwithstanding the clear victory for the proponents of secured lending in the
current version of the U.C.C., Congress balked at full recognition of such claims
when it enacted the Bankruptcy Code. On the one hand, Bankruptcy Code section
instrument. A party who qualifies as a secured creditor will also be deemed a "purchaser" for purposes of
this section. See id. § 9-330, Official Cmt. 2 (noting that priority of secured creditor in possession of
instrument is afforded only if possession is gained in good faith, without knowledge that it violates rights of
secured party which perfected by filing).
'66 U.C.C. § 9-204 (1) (stating "a security agreement may provide that any or all obligations covered by
the security agreement are to be secured by after-acquired collateral."). But see id. § 9-204 (2) (stating "[n]o
security interest attaches under an after-acquired property clause to consumer goods other than accessions
when given as additional security unless the debtor acquires rights in them within ten days after secured
party gives value."); id. § 9-204 (2) Official Cmt. 2 (stating "[t]his Article validates a security interest in the
debtor's existing and future assets.").
167 See U.C.C. § 9-204, Official Cmt. 2 (noting judicial dislike for after-acquired property interests);
see also Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 360 (1925) (expressing judicial disfavor of floating liens)
168See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (stating "a security interest continues in collateral ... and also continues in any
identifiable proceeds."); id. § 9-306(2) Official Cmt. 3 (observing that when debtor disposes of collateral
without permission of secured party, security interest in property continues).
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552(a) 169 establishes the general rule that property acquired after the
commencement of the bankruptcy case is not subject to any lien resulting from a
pre-joetition security agreement. However, Bankruptcy Code section 552(b) creates
an important exception: if the security interest created by a pre-petition agreement
extends to property of the debtor acquired before the commencement of the case
and to the five categories of proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of such
property, then such a security interest extends to such proceeds, product, offspring,
rents, or profits acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case but only
to the70extent provided by the security agreement and by applicable non-bankruptcy
law. 1
The rationale for limiting property rights arising under state law in the context
of after-acquired property in bankruptcy flows directly from the Bankruptcy Code's
policy of rehabilitation.' 7 ' Similar to the debate surrounding the recognition- of
security interests generally, 172 there also has been some scholarly discussion and
constitutional analysis of the congressional power and wisdom in cutting off a
secured creditor's interest in after-acquired property in bankruptcy. 173 Whatever the
169 11 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (1994) (stating "[P]roperty acquired by the estate or by the debtor after the

commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting from any security Agreement entered into by
the debtor before the commencement of the case.").
70
' See 11 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (1) (1994):
[I]f the debtor and an entity entered into a security agreement before the
commencement of the case and if the security interest created by such security
agreement extends to property of the debtor acquired before the commencement of the
case and to proceeds ... of such property, then such security interest extends to such
proceeds ... acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case to the extent
provided by such security agreement and by applicable nonbankruptcy law."
See also Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Days Cal. Riverside Ltd. Partnership (In re Partnership),

27 F.3d 374, 377 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that room receipts from hotel business are "rents for security
purposes" thereby allowing secured creditor to maintain its bargained-for interest); Third Nat'l Bank v.
Fischer (In re Fischer), 184 B.R. 293, 301 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1995) (protecting secured creditors interest
in stock sold post-petition).
171"[Tihe debtor's fresh start should entitle the debtor to use after-acquired property, so long as it is not
property of the estate under § 541(a)(6), free and clear of a pre-bankruptcy lien. This is what § 552(a)
accomplishes with respect to security interests." 15 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 552.01 (15th ed. 1999);
see Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934) (stating that purpose of bankruptcy is to create "new
opportunity in life and the clear field for future" effort"); see also In re Baker, 217 B.R. 609, 611
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1998) (citing cases where courts discussed damaging effect of garnishment on debtors
fresh start after bankruptcy).
172See supratext accompanying notes 73-87 (discussing goals of creditors rights law).
173 For recent analysis of this issue, see Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Immovable
Object Versus the IrresistibleForce: Rethinking the Relationship Between Secured Credit and Bankruptcy
Policy, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2234, 2279 (1997) (arguing that concept of property in general and security
interests as property in particular are metaphorical and should not be rectified in bankruptcy where
distributional policies should be given priority); Steven L. Schwarcz & Janet Malloy Link, Protecting
Rights, Preventing Windfalls: A Model for Harmonizing State and Federal Laws on Floating Liens,
75 N.C. L. REv. 403, 455-56 (1997) (accepting concept of security interests as property but proposing
paradigm of "liquidating collateral" and "non-replacement collateral" to provide predictability to "proceeds"
exception of Bankruptcy Code § 552(b)); see also Lucian Ayre Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy
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wisdom of Bankruptcy Code section 552(a) in eliminating after-acquired property
from the reach of a pre-bankruptcy security agreement, Bankruptcy Code section
552(b) goes far in ameliorating the result. The clarity of Bankruptcy Code section
552(b), however, leaves much to be desired.
Bankruptcy Code section 552(b) gives back part of what subsection (a) takes
away from secured creditors. 74 Outside of bankruptcy, the precise limits of an
automatic security interest in proceeds often is mooted because the debatable
property is also quite likely to constitute after-acquired property. 175 While the "new
entity" theory of the effect of a bankruptcy filing has come under assault, 176 the
filing of a bankruptcy case still creates a temporal cleavage in the powers and
immunities of the debtor for at least some purposes. 177 Bankruptcy Code section
Casefor the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 872-73 (1995) (suggesting that
partial priority for secured claims in bankruptcy would reduce efficiency costs in bankruptcy); Ronald J.
Mann, The First Shall Be Last: A Contextual Argument for Abandoning Temporal Rules Lien Priority,
75 TEXAs L. REv. 11, 21-23 (1996) (asserting that abandonment of temporal lien priorities in bankruptcy
would advance principle of wealth maximization in bankruptcy). One older bankruptcy court case, First
Nat'l Bank of Colorado Springs v. Hamilton (In re Hamilton), 18 B.R. 868, 870 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982),
squarely held that Bankruptcy Code § 552(a) is constitutional.
174See 11 U.S.C. §§ 552 (a), 552 (b) (1994) (denying liens on property acquired after commencement of
case in 552(a) and allowing security interest to extend to after acquired property if security agreement
entered before case extended to debtor's property); see also Financial Assurance, Inc. v. Tollman-Hundley
Dalton, L.P., 74 F.3d 1120, 1124 (1 lth Cir. 1996) (using § 552(b) to find that creditor has security interest
in hotel revenues); In re Northeastern Copy Services, Inc., 175 B.R. 580, 583 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994)
(holding that post-petition cash is not "proceeds" within § 552(b)).
17 See Paulman v. Gateway Venture Partners III (In re Filtercorp, Inc.), 163 F.3d 570, 578
(9th Cit. 1998) (holding that Washington Supreme Court would hold that security interests in inventory and
receivables would "presumptively include" after-acquired property subject to agreement otherwise); see also
Kubota Tractor Corp. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 403 S.E. 2d 218, 222 (1991) (stating that security interest
extends to after-acquired property only if agreement provides for it, subject to exceptions). The irrelevance
of the answer to the question of "proceeds versus after-acquired property" definitely is not moot under the
current U.C.C. where the property is cash proceeds of collateral in a commingled deposit account.
See generally In re San Juan Packers, Inc., 696 F.2d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 1983) (resolving dispute among
bank and other secured creditors of food processor over issue of "identifiability" of security interest in
commingled proceeds). The addition of deposit accounts as primary collateral by Revised Article 9 may
resolve some of these issues. See supra text accompanying notes 150-160.
176See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984).
[O]bviously if the [debtor-in-possession] were a wholly 'new entity,' it would be
unnecessary for the Bankruptcy Code to allow it to reject executory contracts, since it
would not be bound by such contracts in the first place. For our purposes, it is sensible
to view the debtor-in-possession as the same 'entity' which existed before the filing of
the bankruptcy petition, but empowered by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with
its contracts and property in a manner it could not have employed absent the
bankruptcy filing.
Id.See also United States v. James A. Allen (In re Allen), 135 B.R1 856, 868 (1991) (stating "Bildisco has
'laid to rest the 'separate entity' doctrine for all time' (quoting In re Ontario Locomotive & Ins. Ry.
Supplies, 126 B.R 146, 147 (1991)); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy
Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REv. 515, 584-85 (1999) (noting academic and judicial decline of new entity theory
while acknowledging that interests of trustee or debtor-in-possession are not identical to those of prepetition debtor).
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552(a) represents one residual perspective on the "new debtor" phenomenon by
cutting off the previously granted security interest in after-acquired property.'
Outside of bankruptcy, the secured creditor of a debtor who transfers the collateral
to a new entity outside the ordinary course of business retains a security interest in
the property in the hands of the new entity under current law. 179 The secured
creditor's interest extends to the proceeds of the transferred collateral even in the
possession of the transferee. 8 ° The secured creditor would not, however, have an
interest in any after-acquired property of the transferee; U.C.C. section 9-204(1)
binds only the debtor who signed the security agreement.' 8 ' So it is in a bankruptcy
case as well. The Bankruptcy Code substantially duplicates the current nonthe bankruptcy debtor should succeed
bankruptcy result based on the premise that
82
to the state law status of such a transferee.1
'

77

See David Gray Carlson, Voidable Preferences and Proceeds: A Reconceptualization, 71 AM. BANKR.

L.J. 517, 519-20 (1997) (suggesting that "new entity" theory explains powers and new duties of debtor-inpossession better than other theories); Brett W. King, Assuming and Assigning Executory Contracts: A
History ofIndeterminate "ApplicableLaw", 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 95, 125 (1996) (arguing that over-reliance
on ability of debtor-in-possession to reject executory contracts skews analysis against otherwise useful "new
entity" theory); see, e.g., Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 529 (explicating the difference in time that
debtor-in-possession or trustee has to accept or reject executory contract based on whether they filed chapter
11 or 7 respectively).
171See 11 U.S.C § 552(a) (1994); Philip Morris Capital Corp. v. Bering Trader, Inc. (In re Bering)
944 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding secured creditor's pre-petition security interest in debtor's
accounts did not extend to post-petition proceeds); First Nat. Bank of Colorado Springs v. Noble J.
Hamilton (In re Hamilton), 18 B.R. 868, 872-73 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982) (holding although bank had vested
property interest in debtor's after-acquired property, after-acquired property was not subject to bank's liens).
179See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1994) (stating "Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security
interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the
disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and also continues
in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor."); U.C.C. § 9-307(1) ("A buyer in
ordinary course of business other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming
operations takes free of a security interest created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected
and even though the buyer knows of its existence."); see also Steven 0. Weise, Survey: Uniform
Commercial Code (.C.C. Article 9- PersonalProperty Secured Transaction), 47 Bus. LAW. 1593, 1621
(1992) (explaining that Permanent Editorial Board commentary No. 3, comments that security interest in
collateral continues regardless of its sale by borrower under U.C.C. § 9-306(2)).
ISO See U.C.C. § 9-306(2); see also In re Figearo, 79 B.R. 914, 918 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1987)
(holding debtor's property was subject to secured creditor's interest at time debtor transferred property);
Weise, supra note 179, at 1601 (positing security interest continues in collateral regardless of its sale);
Steven 0. Weise, Survey: Uniform Commercial Code (.C.C. Article 9: Recent Development), 52 Bus.
LAW. 1591, 1611 (1997) (opining unless secured party authorizes sale, its security interest continues in
collateral regardless of sale of collateral by debtor).
'a' See Sommers v. I.B.M., 640 F.2d 686, 689 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating financing statement filed by creditor
is not sufficient to perfect security interest as it was not signed by debtor); Valmont Equip. Corp. v. Great
Basin Transp., Inc. (In re Great Basin Transp., Inc.), 32 BR. 365, 368 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983)
(holding debtor "signed" security agreement according to Oklahoma Law); see also Weise, supra note 179,
at 1599 (stating under U.C.C. § 9-203(lXa) debtor must sign security agreement in order for security
interest to exist).
"s Revised U.C.C. § 9-203(d) makes it clear that (1) a transferee of collateral may be bound by the
debtor's security agreement if state law otherwise so provides, or (2) if the transferee becomes generally
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While the policy behind Bankruptcy Code section552(b) may be clear, the
courts have struggled to identify those items of property that fall within one of the
83
five categorical exceptions: proceeds, product, offspring, rents or profits.1
Secured creditors have been successful in persuading Congress to amend
Bankruptcy Code section 552(b) to help clarify the protected status of hotel room
rents and other charges. 84 But it appears unlikely that any systemic changes will be
made to this provision. The Drafting Committee consequently approached the
issue from the other direction; rather than waiting on amendment of Bankruptcy
552(b) by Congress, it revised the definition of proceeds in the
Code section
85
U.C.C.1
3.

Effects of Revised Article 9

While the current definition of proceeds in U.C.C. section 9-306(1) is
characterized by its brevity, 186 Revised U.C.C. section 9-102(a)(64) is more specific
and comprehensive:
obligated for the debtor's obligations and substantially all of the debtor's assets, regardless of other state law.
Bankruptcy Code § 552(a) will, of course, prevail over any contrary result entailed by Revised U.C.C.
§ 9-203(d)(2). See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 48-55 (1978) (adopting view of 2d, 4th, 6th, 8th,
and 9th Circuits that property rights in assets of debtor's estate come under state law and if congress wanted
uniform law it would have expressed it in federal statue).
183Compare In re Delbridge, 61 B.R. 484, 488 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986), affd, 104 B.R. 824
(E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding milk was product of cow), with In re Lawrence, 41 B.R. 36, 37-38 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1984), affd, 56 B.R. 727, 728 (D. Minn. 1984) (holding milk was not product of cow). See, e.g., In
re S.F. Drake Hotel Assocs., 131 B.R. 156, 160 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding hotel room revenues were
rent); Majestic Motel Assocs. v. Casco N. Bank, N.A. (In re Majestic Motel Assocs.), 131 B.R. 523, 525
(Bankr. D. Me. 1991) (finding hotel room revenues are not "rents" and "profits" within meaning of security
agreements under Maine law).
184The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 added subsection (bX2) to Bankruptcy Code § 552.
See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 214, 108 Stat. 4106, 4126. With this
amendment Congress actually improved the priority" status of mortgagees with an assignment of rents.
Bankruptcy Code § 552(b)(2) deems such creditors to be perfected even if they have not complied with the
common state-law requirement that a receiver be appointed to make their interest in rents choate. The
amended § 552 (b)(2) specifies that if the debtor and creditor entered into a security agreement before the
commencement of the case, a security interest is created and this includes rents received for the use of hotel,
motel or other public facilities. See id. See also Financial Sec, Assurance, Inc. v. Tollman-Hundley Dalton,
L.P., 74 F.3d 1120, 1124-25 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (declaring creditor's pre-petition security interest in revenues
from chapter 11 debtor's hotel was security interest in "rents," within meaning of Bankruptcy statute
providing for continued validity of such pre-petition security interests post-petition); In re S.F. Drake Hotel
Assocs., 131 B.R. at 160 (finding under California law, hotel room revenue was rent, not accumulation of
accounts, thus remained subject to lien of pre-bankruptcy deed of trust which contained rents, issues and
profits clause).
'85See Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(aX64) (1999) (defining term "proceeds"with more specificity).
'86U.C.C.

§ 9-306(1) states:
"Proceeds" includes whatever is received upon the sale, exchange,
collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable
by reason of loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds, except to the
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"Proceeds" means the following property:
(A) whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license,
exchange, or other
disposition of collateral;
(B) whatever is collected on, or distributed on account of,
collateral;
(C) rights arising out of collateral;
(D) to the extent of the value of the collateral, claims arising
out of the loss, nonconformity, or interference with the use
of, defect or infringement of rights in, or damage to , the
collateral; or
(E) to the extent of the value of collateral and to the extent
payable to the debtor or the secured party, insurance
payable by reason of the loss or nonconformity or, defects
87
or infringement of rights in, or damage to, the collateral.,
Revised U.C.C. section 9-102(a)(64) will impact bankruptcy cases in at least one
area. In 1993, the Tenth Circuit had held in In re Hastie88 that cash dividends on
stock pledged as collateral in a pre-petition transaction were not proceeds of the
secured creditor's collateral because a cash dividend was not a "disposition" of the
collateral.' 8 9 U.C.C. section 9-306(1) was amended in 1996 to overturn this result
but at least one bankruptcy court had also concluded that the proceeds of a lease of
underlying collateral did not constitute proceeds of collateral. 190 Both cases were
extent that it is payable to a person other than a party to the security
agreement. Any payments or distributions made with respect to investment
property collateral are proceeds. Money, checks, deposit accounts, and the
like are "cash proceeds". All other proceeds are "non-cash proceeds."
U.C.C. § 9-306(1); see also In re Reda, Inc., 54 B.R. 871, 876 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1985) (interpreting
9-306(1) to mean that right to payment of insurance proceeds on account of damage to Article 9 collateral is
"proceeds" for Article 9 purposes); Freyermuth, supra note 88, at 652-54 (discussing judicial interpretation
of § 9-306(1) proceeds).
" Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64).
'88 FDIC v. Hastie (In re Hastie), 2 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1993); see State Street Bank & Trust Company v.
Allen M. Mintz (In re Mintz), 192 B.R. 313, 319 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (following logic of Hastie,
bankruptcy court held distributions on limited partnership interests were not proceeds within meaning of
U.C.C. § 9-306(1)). But see Weise, supra note 180, at 1620 (stating both Hastie court and Mintz court were
in error).
189 "The receipt of cash dividends by a registered owner of certificated securities bears no resemblance to
the events specified in the definition of proceeds or to an act of disposition generally." In re Hastie,
2 F.3d at 1045; see also In re Mintz, 192 B.R at 319 n.9 (defining disposition as permanent transfer of

possession).
'90See General Electric Credit Corp. v. Cleary Brothers Construction Co., Inc. (In re Cleary Brothers
Construction Co., Inc.), 9 B.R. 40,41 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980) (finding although secured party had perfected
lien in equipment, it did not have perfected interest in lease of equipment, thus proceeds did not include
rents from lease of equipment); see also In re Keneco Financial Group, Inc., 131 B.R. 90, 96
(Bankr. N.D. 111.
1991) (holding rent received was proceeds of lease contract); Feldman v. Philadelphia
National Bank, 408 F.Supp. 24, 37-38 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (finding same).

-
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arguably incorrect even under the version of the U.C.C. then in effect.' 91 Whatever
the case, the inclusion of the word "lease" in Revised U.C.C. section 9102(a)(64)(A) and the expression "whatever is . . . distributed on account of [,]
collateral" in section 9-102(a)(64)(B) should now resolve both of these issues in
favor of the secured creditor rather than the bankruptcy estate. 92
Bankruptcy trustees will also need to account for another effect of subsection
(B) of the expanded definition of proceeds. The grant of a security interest in an
account, chattel paper, document, general intangible, instrument or investment
property carries with it an automatically attached security interest in any supporting
obligation or other lien securing a right to payment in which the debtor has granted
a security interest. 193 If the security interest in the supporting obligation or lien is
perfected, its proceeds too are the secured creditor's collateral. 94 The ability to
perfect a security interest by an "all assets" filing in collateral formerly perfectible
only by possession, combined with the automatic extension of security interests to
supporting obligations (and all their proceeds, broadly defined), will reduce the
assets available to the bankruptcy trustee.
Finally, Revised U.C.C. section 9-102(a)(64)(C) and (D) expand the concept of
proceeds into new territory. It is clear under current U.C.C. section 9-306(1) that a
payment by insurer on the destruction of collateral is proceeds. 9 5 But current law is
191See Weise, supranote 158, at 1613 n. 125 (criticizing ClearyBros.); see also Weise, supranote 180, at
1620 (remarking that Hastie ruling was incorrect).
192 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-312(a) (1999) (permitting perfection by filing). As a result, the secured
creditor will be entitled to cash dividends even if it does not have possession of the investment security.
See supra text accompanying notes 162-165. The secured creditor will be entitled to cash dividends even if
it does not have possession of the investment security because Revised U.C.C. § 9-312(a) permits perfection
by filing. See id.
"9'See Revised U.C.C. § 9-203(f) (stating "[t]he attachment of a security interest in collateral gives the
secured party the rights to proceeds provided by § 9-315 and is also attachment of a security interest in a
supporting obligation for the collateral."); id. § 9-203(g) (stating "[t]he attachment of a security interest in a
right to payment or performance secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property is
also attachment of a security interest in the security interest, mortgage, or other lien."); see also supra text
accompanying notes 51-52.
' See Revised U.C.C. § 9-102 Official Cmt. 13b:
Under subparagraph (B), collections on and distributions on account of collateral
consisting of various credit-support arrangements ('supporting obligations,' as defined
in Section 9-102) also are proceeds. Consequently, they are afforded treatment
identical to proceeds collected from or distributed by the obligor on the underlying
(supported) right to payment or other collateral. Proceeds of supporting obligations
also are proceeds of the underlying rights to payment or other collateral.
'9' See U.C.C. § 9-306, Official Cmt. 1 (1994) (stating "[t]his section...makes clear that insurance
proceeds from casualty loss of collateral are proceeds within the meaning of this section."); see generally
Sicherman v. Falkenberg (In re Falkenberg), 136 B.R. 481,485 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992) (finding insurance
proceeds that debtor received following destruction of motorcycle in which creditor had security interest
qualifies as "proceeds" of motorcycle); A. Eric Kauders, Jr., Note, Substitution of Proceeds Theory for
UC.C. § 9-306(5), or, the Expansive Life and Times of a Proceeds Security Interest, 80 VA. L. REV.
787, 803 (1994) (discussing high costs of litigation in determining what qualifies as proceeds within scope
of modem secured transaction).
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not equally clear on the status of claims a debtor may have for breach of warranty
or other non-insurance claims related to collateral.196 Under revised Article 9 all
such claims arising out of collateral will be deemed its proceeds. The secured
creditor's interest in them will thus be automatically perfected regardless of
whether they arise in tort or contract,97even if the secured creditor does not have a
direct interest in general intangibles.
The increased breadth of the definition of proceeds under Revised Article 9
will expand the safe-harbor of Bankruptcy Code section 552(b). The changes
effected by Revised U.C.C. section 9-102(a)(64) are not nearly as far reaching as
those that increase the scope of Article 9 and relax the requirements related to
perfection. Nonetheless, they will reduce the number and value of assets free of
secured claims in bankruptcy cases.

Ill.

OTHER AREAS OF BANKRUPTCY IMPACTED BY REVISED ARTICLE 9

The revisions to Article 9 can be ordered according to various schemes. Most
previously published articles have considered them in light of the organizational
outline of Article 9 itself. This article has considered 'them as they impact
bankruptcy through the lenses of Bankruptcy Code sections 544(a) and 552(b).
This piece has not attempted to be exhaustive of the changes that Revised Article 9
will bring but has attempted to describe those that will be most significant in the
bankruptcy context.
There are a number of additional changes that will affect assets in bankruptcy
and the competing interests in them. While these considerations could have been
categorized under Parts B.A or lI.B above, their unique character and focused
impact merit separate treatment.

'96U.C.C. § 9-306(1) does not explicitly reach such claims, which are things in action. On the one hand,
current U.C.C. § 9-106 includes things in action from the category of general intangible. On the other, the
definition of account would cover things in action only to the extent they arise out of a claim for goods sold
or leased or from services rendered. Furthermore, to the extent claims arising out of destruction sound in
tort, they are excluded from current Article 9. U.C.C. § 9-104(k). Thus, claims for breach of warranty or
injury to collateral remain almost exclusively outside the purview of current § 9-306(1). See generally
Reymet Federal Credit Union v. Jones (In re Jones), 19 B.R. 293, 295-96 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982)
(holding debt of insurance agent arising out of failure to procure insurance on collateral was dischargeable
on ground that debt was not secured creditor's collateral because it was not proceeds of collateral);
In re Continental Trucking, Inc., 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 526, 529-30 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (holding payment on
account ofjudgment in lawsuit for negligence and breach of implied warranty was not proceeds of creditor's
security interest in vehicle).
197 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-315(c) (1999) (stating "[a] security interest in proceeds
is a perfected security
interest if the security interest in the original collateral was perfected."); Smith, supra note 36, at 14-22
(perfecting security interest could occur by filing appropriate financing statements, taking possession or
controlling collateral, or by automatic perfection upon attachment).
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PurchaseMoney Security Interests

By the end of the nineteenth century common law courts had held that those
holding purchase money security interests in property other than inventory were
entitled to priority even over earlier recorded secured creditors.' 98 The fungible and
ever-changing nature of inventory, however, prevented most courts still dominated
by the concepts of legal formalism from extending the concept of purchase money
priority to that form of property.' 99 In more recent years economic and other policybased theories
have been advanced to justify the existence of purchase money
2
priority. 00

The current version of Article 9 permits sellers and lenders to obtain purchase
money security interests in any form of goods.20' Revised Article 9 slightly expands

198See United States vs. New Orleans Railroad, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 362, 365 (1870) (holding previous
mortgage secured by after-acquired property attached to that property in condition mortgagor received it,
including its subjection to purchase money encumbrance). The Supreme Court was also instrumental in
extending the priority of purchase money security interests outside the railroad context. See Holt v. Henley,
232 U.S. 637, 639-40 (1914) (holding seller who retained title to automatic sprinkler system installed in
factory had priority over previous mortgage notwithstanding sprinkler's status as fixture subject to
mortgage). For a discussion of the history of the priority of purchase money security interests see Russell A.
Hakes, AccordingPurchaseMoney Status ProperPriority,72 OR. L. REv. 323 passim (1993).
199See Zartman v. First National Bank of Waterloo, 82 N.E. 127, 129 (N.Y. 1907) (holding inventory
vendors purportedly retained title was inconsistent with debtor's unfettered control of inventory and that
retention of interest in inventory would prejudice unsecured creditors). See also supra note 167;
Skilton v. Codington, 77 N.E. 790, 793 (N.Y. 1906) (concluding plaintiff, as trustee in bankruptcy of
mortgagor, has same rights as creditor armed with attachment or execution); New York Sec. & Trust Co. v.
Saratoga Gas & Elec. Light Co., 53 N.E. 758, 760 (N.Y. 1899) (holding lien upon earnings attaches only
upon what is earned after time when lien is perfected by entry and possession); Stephens v. Perrine,
39200
N.E. 11, 13 (N.Y. 1894) (holding mortgagor cannot add to his title by his own act).
See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financingand PrioritiesAmong Creditors,
88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1167 (1979) (stating "[a]lthough the after-acquired property clause saves costs, it also
creates what economists call a 'situational monopoly,' in that a creditor with a security interest in afteracquired property enjoys a special competitive advantage over other lenders in all his [sic] subsequent
dealings with-the debtor"); L. LOPUCKI, ET AL.., COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 1108 (1998) (positing "[a]
secured party may be willing to tolerate the debtor's acquisition of additional collateral through purchase
money financing because it increases the aggregate value of the secured party's collateral."). As with the
earlier questions regarding the value of the concept of secured debt and the propriety of cutting off a secured
creditor interest in after-acquired property in bankruptcy, it is not necessary to resolve this policy issue to
analyze the effect of Revised Article 9 in this area. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 984-99 (1972) (discussing expected value and variance in financial
contexts).
201U.C.C. § 9-107 states:
A security interest is a 'purchase money security interest' to the extent that it is:
A. taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price;
or
B. taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives
value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value
is in fact so used.

1999]

REVISED U C.C ARTICLE 9: IMPACT IN BANKRUPTCY

the categories of property in which purchase money priority may be obtained to
include software as well as goods.2 °2
Three troublesome issues arose in connection with purchase money security
interests in bankruptcy since the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code: the conflict
between non-uniform variations on ten-day window of perfection under U.C.C.
section 9-312(4),203 and Bankruptcy Code section 547(c)(3)(B), 2°4 and the judicial
creations of the "transformation rule" and the "dual status rule". 20 5 Revised Article
9 now makes the period of perfection after possession (for goods other than
inventory) a uniform 20 days.20 6 The response of the Drafting Committee to the
efforts of the courts to reduce the scope of purchase money security interests is also
clear.
Some courts in applying the so-called transformation rule concluded that an
otherwise properly perfected purchase money security interest would lose its
purchase money priority in certain circumstances, generally where the purchase
money security interest secured an obligation in addition to the purchase price of
the collateral.20 7 While the great bulk of decisions applying the transformation rule
have been in the consumer context, in 1985 the Eleventh Circuit extended it to the
202The

Revised U.C.C. § 9-103 states:

(a) In this section:
(.
'purchase-money collateral' means goods or software that secures a
purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral.
203The current uniform version of U.C.C. § 9-312(4) provides: "A purchase money security interest in
collateral other than inventory has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral or its
proceeds if the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of the
collateral or within ten days thereafter." Due to backlogs in filing financing statements at the offices of
various Secretaries of State, the time within which to perfect to gain the purchase money priority in
collateral other than inventory has been increased to 20 or more days in many states except the District of
Columbia and South Carolina, which have retained the ten-day period, and Georgia and Florida which have
increased the perfection period to 15 days. See 9 RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312:4 (3d ed. rev. 1994).
20
4 In 1994, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to increase the time from 10 to 20 days for perfection
of purchase money security interests as an exception to the preference rule of Bankruptcy Code § 547(b).
See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 203, 108 stat 4106, 4121-22.
205See Billings v. AVCO Colorado Indus. Bank (In re Billings), 838 F.2d 405, 409 (10th Cir. 1988)
(noting basic problem with automatic transformation rule is that it discourages creditor who has purchase
money security interest from helping their debtors work out financial problems without surrendering
collateral security of debt).
206 "[A] perfected purchase-money security interest in goods other than inventory or livestock has priority
over a conflicting security interest in the same goods, and ... a perfected security interest in its identifiable
proceeds also has priority, if the purchase-money security interest is perfected when the debtor receives
possession of the collateral or within 20 days thereafter." Revised U.C.C. § 9-324(a).
207 See Roberts Furniture Co. v. Pierce (In re Manuel), 507 F.2d 990, 993 (5th Cir. 1975)
(holding combination of add-on clause with failure to release any collateral until all payments had been
made defeated the purchase money character of even first transaction); Sims Furniture Co. v. Trotter
(In re Trotter), 12 B.R. 72, 74 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981) (noting subsequent loan consolidation destroyed
purchase money status); Quality Furniture Co, v. Cooper (In re Johnson), I Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1023,
1024-25 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1975) (concluding provision in purchase money security agreement securing
future advances defeated any purchase money status).
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world of commercial lending in Southtrust
Bank ofAlabama, National Association
2
08
Corp.
Acceptance
v. Borg-Warner
Courts and commentators roundly criticized the transformation rule.209 Revised
Article 9 does something about it. Except in consumer transactions, a purchase
money transaction will not lose that status even though (1) the purchase money
collateral cross-collateralizes another non-purchase money transaction, (2) the
purchase money obligation is also secured by non-purchase money collateral or (3)
the purchase money obligation has been "renewed, refinanced, consolidated, or
restructured. ' ,210 And even the inference that otherwise might be drawn from the
exclusion of consumer transactions from the coverage of Revised U.C.C. section 9103(f) is rebutted by section 9-103(h).2 1'
A number of courts developed the dual status rule as a means by which to avoid
the draconian effect of the transformation rule.21 2 This rule permits a creditor to
retain the benefits of purchase money status in situations where they would be lost
by application of the transformation rule but only if there is some means by which
to separate payments on the purchase money obligation from payments on the nonpurchase money one. 213 Revised U.C.C. section 9-103 directly implements a
version of the dual status rule, at least outside the consumer lending context, that
should protect the2 1purchase
money status of transactions in all but the most
4
egregious contexts.
208 760 F. 2d 1240, 1243 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that "BWAC's exercise of the future advances and

after-acquired property clauses in its security agreements with the debtors destroyed its PMSI").
209 The rule has often been criticized because there was no basis for it in the text of the U.C.C. See David
Gray Carlson, Purchase Money Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 IDAHO L. REv. 793, 832-33
(1992/1993); Mary Aronov, The Transformation Rule Applied to Purchase Money Security Interests in
Commercial Lending Transactions, 16 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 15 (1985).
20 Revised U.C.C. § 9-103(f) (1999).
211See Revised U.C.C. § 9-103(h) (stating intention of drafters of Revised U.C.C. § 9-103 (h) was to leave
final determination of rules of consumer-goods transaction to discretion of court).
The limitation of the rules in subsections (e), (f), and (g) to transactions other than
consumer-goods transactions is intended to leave to the court the determination of the
proper rules in consumer-goods transactions. The court may not infer from that
limitation the nature of the proper rule in consumer-goods transactions and may
continue to apply established approaches.
Id.
212 See Billings v. AVCO Colorade Indus. Bank (In re Billings), 838 F.2d 405, 408 (10th Cir. 1988)
(reasoning transformation rule is inconsistent with Commercial Code, while dual-status rule is more in
harmony with U.C.C.); Pristas v. Landaus of Plymouth Inc. (In re Pristas), 742 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1984)
(claiming transformation rule is misguided because of its narrow view of purchase-money security device
and its failure to consider critical language in § 9-107 -- "to the extent"); In re Gibson, 16 B.R. 257, 266
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) (finding transformation rule defeats purpose of having uniform system of priorities).
213See In re Pristas, 742 F.2d at 801 (reasoning creditor's purchase-money status will survive as long as
there is method of allocation to determine extent to which payment of other purchases is affected and to
which particular item secures its own price); see also Kelley v. United American Bank in Knoxville
(In re Kelley), 17 B.R. 770, 772 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (asserting apportionment between purchase
money and non-purchase money obligations secured by same collateral is permissible).
214Revised U.C.C. § 9-103(e) (1999):
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Consumer lien avoidance actions under Bankruptcy Code section 522(f) will
sustain the greater part of the impact of Revised Article 9 on the transformation and
dual status rules. 215 In most commercial purchase money transactions the battle
involves two secured creditors, not the debtor (or the trustee) and the putative
purchase money financier.216 A loss of purchase money status rarely entails the loss
of a security interest in its entirety. 217 The question of the relative priority between
those creditors generally does not impact the ultimate distribution to unsecured
creditors. Bankruptcy Code section 522(f)(1)(B), however, provides that an
individual debtor whose exemptions are impaired by a "nonpossessory,
nonpurchase-money security interest" in certain personal, family or household
goods may avoid that security interest. 218 The Bankruptcy Code does not define
[I]f the extent to which a security interest is a purchase-money security interest
depends on the application of a payment to a particular obligation, the payment must
be applied:
(1)

in accordance with any reasonable method of application to which the

parties agree;
(2)

in the absence of the parties' agreement to a reasonable method, in
accordance with any intention of the obligor manifested at or before the time
of payment; or

(3) in the absence of an agreement to a reasonable method and a timely
manifestation of the obligor's intention, in the following order:
(A) to obligations that are not secured; and
(B) if more than one obligation is secured, to obligations secured by
purchase-money security interests in the order in which those
obligations were incurred.
See id. § 9-103, Official. Cmt. 7; see also In re Pristas, 742 F.2d at 801 (stating purchase money status of
creditor will survive as long as security agreement provides method of allocation for subsequent purchases).
215See In re Pristas, 742 F.2d at 801 (stating creditor's interest will only be nullified if his interest is nonpurchase money security; otherwise, as long.as method of allocation exists, purchase-money security status
will survive); see also In re Billings, 838 F.2d at 410 (claiming exemption provisions of § 522(f) allows
debtor to undo consequences of contracts of adhesion, thereby eliminating any unfair advantage previously
enjoyed by creditors). However, such exemptions only applies to invalidation of creditor's non-purchase
money security interest, thus making it extremely difficult for a debtor to avoid lien pursuant to § 522 (f)
when creditor has purchase money security interest. See id.
216 See In re Sunrise R.V. Inc., 107 B.R. 277, 278-79 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1989) (exemplifying another
commercial purchase money suit involving controversy between two creditors, not debtor versus creditor);
United States v. Williams (In re Williams), 82 B.R. 430, 431-32 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1988) (showing dispute
in commercial purchase money case to be between two creditors); ITT Diversified Credit Corp. v. Daniels
(In re Daniels), 35 B.R. 247, 248 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983) (depicting priority conflict among two
creditors).
217 See Lee v. Davis/McGraw, Inc. (In re Lee), 169 B.R. 790, 792 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994)
(asserting purchase money security interest may be "transformed" into non-purchase money security interest
but there is not entire loss of security interest); see also Roberts Furniture Co. v. Pierce (In re Manuel),
507 F.2d 990, 992 (5th Cir 1975); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Freeman (In re Freeman), 124 B.R. 840, 843
(N.D. Ala. 1991) (reasoning that purchase money status may be "transformed" to non-purchase status but
security interest still remains).
218See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (f)(1XB) (1994) (stating debtor may avoid a lien pursuant to exemptions from
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"purchase-money" for this purpose. 219 And although the Official Comments to
Revised U.C.C. section 9-103 gratuitously disclaim the authority to define a term of
federal bankruptcy law, 220 bankruptcy courts may be persuaded that neither the
transformation nor dual 221
status rules should continue to apply even for consumer
purposes.
lien avoidance
The goal of the Drafting Committee to reduce the means by which debtors as well as
trustees can avoid liens, whether under Bankruptcy Code section 544(a) or section 522(f), is
well-served by the changes relating to purchase money security interests under Revised
Article 9.222 The values of party autonomy and freedom of contract may have been
Bankruptcy Code); 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1XB) (1999):
(1) [T]he debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property
to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been
entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is (B) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any i.
household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances,
books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held
primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor;
ii.. implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or
the trade of a dependent of the debtor; or
iii. professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of
the debtor.
Id.; see also Keller v. Household Finance Corp. Retail Servs., Inc. (In re Keller), 29 B.R. 91, 92
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983); In re Hoffman, 11 B.R. 689, 690 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (stipulating that
§ 522 (f) provide ways for debtor to avoid lien on his property interests).
219 See In re Hillard, 198 BR. 620, 622 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996); In re Carter, 169 B.R. 227, 228
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993); Fickey v. Bank of LaFayette (In re Fickey), 23 B.R. 586, 588 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1982) (claiming that because definition of "purchase money security interest" is not in Bankruptcy Code,
courts must look to relevant state law).
220 See Revised U.C.C. §.9-103, Official Cmt. 8 (discussing proper authority to define "purchase-money
security interest"). "(D]ecisions under Bankruptcy Code Section 522(f) have applied both the dual-status
and the transformation rules. The Bankruptcy Code does not expressly adopt the state law definition of
'purchase-money security interest.' Where federal law does not defer to this Article, this Article does not,
and could not, determine a question of federal law." Id. § 9-103 Official Cmt. 8; see also In re Adoptante,
140 B.R. 940, 941-42 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992); In re Manuel 507 F.2d at 993 (finding definition of "purchase
money security interest" comes from state law, not Bankruptcy Code).
221 Of course, most courts in bankruptcy cases do look to the U.C.C. for the definition of "purchase
money." See Billings v. AVCO Colorado Indus. Bank (In re Billings), 838 F.2d 405, 406 (10th Cir. 1988)
(stating "[t]he Bankruptcy Code does not define 'purchase money security interest.' For this definition, the
courts have uniformly looked to the law of the state in which the security interest is created."); Pristas v.
Landaus of Plymouth, Inc. (In re Pristas), 742 F.2d 797, 800 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting "[t]he Bankruptcy Act
does not define 'purchase-money security interest.' Therefore, we look to state law."); In re Adoptante,
140 B.R. at 941 (finding state law must be used to define "purchase money security interest").
222 See Bond's Jewelers, Inc. v. Linklater (In re Linklater), 48 B.R. 916, 919 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985)
(observing policies underlying both transformation rule and dual status rule are to "encourage security
agreements that benefit both buyer and seller, and to facilitate the roles of consumer good.") This policy is
best served by applying dual status rule which does make it more difficult for debtors to avoid liens pursuant
to § 522 (f) or § 544 (a) because it is less likely that creditor will lose his purchase money status. See id.;
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successfully3 advanced at some slight cost to the presumed benefits of the fresh start
22

principle.

B.

Consignments

Consignments have bedeviled lawyers and judges applying the U.C.C. since its
inception, although many of the problems concern the interpretation of U.C.C.
section 2-326 more than Article 9.224 Notwithstanding the recognition of true
consignments by the U.C.C., many bankruptcy courts have uncritically applied
U.C.C. section 2-326 to defeat the interests of true consignors who have failed to
22
file a financing statement publicizing their interests. 5
Surrendering to popular legal (mis)understanding, adoption of Revised Article
9 will involve amending U.C.C. section 1-201(37) to delete the exclusion of
consignments from the definition of security interest.226 And, rather than waiting
for the conclusion of the work of the committee charged with redrafting Article
2,227 Revised Article 9 will also remove U.C.C. section 2-326(3), which was the
see also In re Pristas, 742 F.2d at 801 (stating same); In re Gibson, 16 B.R. 257, 267-68
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) (stating same).
223 Revised Article 9 also makes it easier for purchase money financiers of inventory to attain priority for
all inventory. See Revised U.C.C. § 9-103(bX2) (1999). This provision will not be discussed further because
its application will almost always involve the relative priority of two secured creditors, not the existence vel
non of the security interest itself. Revised U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2) also makes it clear that the obligation
secured by the purchase money collateral includes expenses incurred in connection with acquiring and
delivering the collateral to the debtor plus costs of collection upon default. See also, Official Comment 3 to
Revised U.C.C. § 9-103 (1999).
224 See Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Treatment of Consignments in Bankruptcy:
Two Codes and Their
Fictions, At Play, in the Fields, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 73, 77-85 (1989) (discussing confusion wrought by
multiple distinctions introduced by U.C.C. § 2-326 into straightforward common law conception of
consignments). Under the current Article 1, a true consignment is not a security interest. See U.C.C.
§ 1-201(37) (1994). Consignments intended as security are controlled by Article 9. See id. Even true
consignments, however, are subject to U.C.C. § 2-326. See id. The effect of Article 2 on such consignments
is to make the filing of a financing statement the most efficient means of preserving the consignor's
ownership interest. See Hillinger, supra, at 83-85.
225 See First Interstate Bank of California v. Great Am. Veal, Inc.
(In re Great Am. Veal, Inc.), 59 B.R. 27,
31-33 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985) (finding consignor subordinate to secured creditor under U.C.C. § 9-114
because it failed to file financing statement); Star Furniture Warehouse, Inc. v. Marcoly (In re Marcoly),
32 B.R. 423, 425 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983) (denying reclamation claim of true consignor because it failed to
file financing statement); Yugorsky v. New York Diamond and Jewelry Exch., Inc. (In re New York
Diamond and Jewelry Exch., Inc.), 26 B.R. 32, 33-34 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (treating consignor's interest
as unperfected security interest subject to avoidance by bankruptcy trustee).
226 "'Security interest' means an interest in personal property or fixtures which
secures payment or
performance of an obligation. The term also includes any interest of a consignor." Revised U.C.C.
§ 1-201(37). See In re Chicago Coastal Motor Express, Inc., 1992 WL 309184, at *7-8
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1992) (stating definition of "security interest" according to U.C.C. § 1-201 (37Xb));
In re Loop Hospital Partnership, 35 B.R. 929, 933 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1983) (stating same).
227 The ALl approved drafts of a Revised Article 2 and Revised Article 2A in May 1999.
The NCCUSL;
however, rebuffed submitting them to the states for adoption. The NCCUSL and ALl have appointed a new
drafting committee to try to salvage the previous efforts. See ALl and NCCUSL Announce New Drafting
Committee for UCC Articles 2 and 2A, (August 18, 1999) <http://www.nccusl.org/pressrel/ucc2a2.htm>.
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source of much of the confusion about the functionally equivalent transactions:
those "deemed to be on sale or return".228 Virtually all consignments,2 29 whether
true or intended as security, and whether deemed to be on sale or return or not, will
now be governed by Revised Article 9.230 Consignors will have even less ground on
which to defend against a trustee's avoidance action under Bankruptcy Code section
544(a) after adoption of Revised Article 9 than they do today.2 3' Consignors
must
232
file financing statements to protect their ostensible ownership interests.
"'See U.C.C. § 2-326 Revised Official Cmt. 4. ("Certain true consignment transactions were dealt with in
former Sections 2-326(3) and 9-114. These provisions have been deleted and have been replaced by new
provisions in Article 9."); supra text accompanying note 227.
229 "Consignment" is now defined in Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(20):
"Consignment" means a transaction, regardless of its form, in which a person delivers
goods to a merchant for the purpose of sale and:
A. the merchant
(i) deals in goods of that kind under a name other than the name of the person
making delivery;
(ii) is not an auctioneer; and
(iii) is not generally known by its creditors to be substantially engaged in
selling the goods of others;
B. with respect to each delivery, the aggregate value of the goods is $1,000 or
more at the time of delivery;
C. the goods are not consumer goods immediately before delivery; and
D. the transaction does not create a security interest that secures an obligation.
Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(20) (1999). According to Official Comment 6 to Revised U.C.C. § 9-109, a
conceptual category of "bailments for sale" even remains outside the broadened penumbra of consignment
under Revised Article 9. Whether this small gap will have any impact in bankruptcy cases remains to be
seen. Given the courts' willingness to subject even true consignments under the current U.C.C. to analysis as
unperfected secured transactions, it seems unlikely that any consignment for sale will escape the same result
under Revised Article 9. But see cases cited infra note 233(giving examples of bailment situations that will
probably remain outside scope of Revised Article 9).
230 "[T]his article applies to: . . . (4) a consignment." Revised U.C.C. § 9-109(aX4); see Multibank
National of Western Massachusetts v. State Street Auto Sales, Inc. (In re State Street Auto Sales, Inc.),
81 B.R. 215, 217-18 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (asserting consignments are not governed by U.C.C Article 9);
Finance America Corporation v. Morris (In re KLP, Inc.), 7 BR. 256, 257 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (stating

same).

231 Revised U.C.C. § 9-319(a) makes it clear that "for purposes of determining the rights of
creditors of,
and purchasers for value of goods from, a consignee, while the goods are in the possession of the consignee,
the consignee is deemed to have rights and title to the goods identical to those the consignor had or had
power to transfer." Revised U.C.C. § 9-319(a). The trustee's avoidance power under Bankruptcy Code
§ 544(a) will not reach the consigned goods if they have been returned to the consignor. If those goods were
returned within the 90 days prior to bankruptcy, some bankruptcy courts have concluded that a preferential
transfer has taken place. See Bakst v. Wheeler Oil Co. (In re Denmark Co.), 73 B.R. 325, 326
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); Makoroff v. Butler Tire Center (In re Castle Tire Center, Inc.), 56 B.R. 180,
182-83 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986). This result seems clearly incorrect if applied to cases of true consignment
where the consignor-consignee relationship is not one of creditor-debtor and thus the return of the consigned
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The changes made to the U.C.C. concerning consignments may marginally
increase the number of transactions that bankruptcy trustees may avoid.23 3 In
contrast to most of the modifications previously discussed, those in connection with
a consignment reduce the sphere of party autonomy.234 These changes, however,
goods cannot be "to or for the benefit of a creditor" as required by Bankruptcy Code § 544; See Hillinger,
supranote 224, at 106-19.
232Consignments will be treated as a purchase-money security interest in inventory (Revised U.C.C.
§ 9-103(d)) which requires the filing of a financing statement. Revised U.C.C. § 9-310(a). The consignor
will also be obliged to comply with the requirements of Revised U.C.C. § 9-324(b) to have priority over a
competing secured claim in inventory:
[A] perfected purchase-money security interest in inventory has priority over a
conflicting security interest in the same inventory... if:
(1) the purchase-money security interest is perfected when the debtor receives
possession of the inventory;
(2). the purchase-money secured party sends an authenticated notification to the
holder of the conflicting security interest;
(3) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives the notification within
five years before the debtor receives possession of the inventory; and
(4) the notification states that the person sending the notification has or expects
to acquire a purchase-money security interest in inventory of the debtor and
describes the inventory.
Revised U.C.C. § 9-324(b). See generally, Chase Manhattan Bank v. Nemko, Inc. (In re Nemko, Inc.),
209 B.R 590, 608 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding primary lender failed to file financing statement as
required in New York under U.C.C. § 9-103 thus losing his security interest in debtors, inventory,
equipment and accounts receivable). Compare ATG Aerospace, Inc., v. High-Line Aviation Ltd.,
(In re High-Line Aviation, Inc.), 149 B.R. 730, 736 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992) (noting defendant, ATG,
concedes that by not filing financing statement its interest in parts was not perfected under U.C.C. Article
9), with Gennet v. Fason (In re P.C. Systems, Inc.), 163 B.R. 382, 386-87 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994) (noting
creditors interest in items that have been submitted by debtor as collateral is perfected upon filing financial
statement in state where property is located).
233Nonetheless, it appears unlikely that Revised Article 9 would change the result in the following cases.
See Glenshaw Glass Co. v. Ontario Grape Growers' Marketing Bd. (In re Keystone Foods, Inc.),
67 F.3d 470, 477 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that grapes delivered for processing into juice, even when
coupled with option by processor to purchase juice, remained bailment free from competing claims of
secured lender and bankruptcy trustee); In re Oriental Rug Warehouse Club, Inc., 205 B.R. 407, 410-11
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1997) (asserting classification of particular transaction between debtor and creditor, as
governed by U.C.C. as true consignment or secured transaction, dependant on parties' intent); Robbins v.
Comerica Bank-Detroit (In re Zwagerman), 125 B.R. 486, 491-92 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991)
(holding delivery of cattle for custom feeding to livestock grower, who also raised cattle for sale,
constituted true bailment that was free of rival claims); U.C.C. states that secured party, (creditor) has
burden of establishing security interest was formed upon sale of collateral. See In re Oriental Rug
Warehouse Club, Inc., 205 B.1L at 411.
234See GBS Meat Industry Pty. Ltd. v. Kress-Dobkin Co., Inc., 474 F.Supp. 1357, 1363 (W.D. Pa. 1979)
(holding secured creditor's actual knowledge of consignment prevents that same creditor from asserting
priority interest in consigned goods); In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 215 B.R. 409, 417
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997) (noting party claiming that entitlement to superior treatment over other creditors,
in distribution of assets, has burden of proving such entitlement); Budsberg v. Premier Credit Co. (In re
Kincaid), 218 BR. 965, 968 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1998) (noting U.C.C. drafters attempted to keep with
objectives of reducing costs of secured transactions by attempting to allocate burdens to those who can best
handle them).
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appear to have more to do with recognizing how courts were applying the current
version of the U.C.C. and less to do with importing distributional values into
revised Article 9.
C.

Dispositionof Collateral

Revised Article 9 settles two long-simmering disputes that will have an impact
235
on the extent of a deficiency the secured creditor may claim in a bankruptcy case.
Various courts have adopted three approaches to the remedy available to debtors
when the secured creditor fails to dispose of collateral in a commercially
reasonable manner. 236 A majority of courts have concluded that there is a rebuttable
presumption that the value of the collateral was at least equal to the amount of the
debt. 237 In these jurisdictions the court must determine what the sale price should
have been and apply that amount to reduce any deficiency. In contrast, are those
cases that stand for the proposition that a creditor who violates the sale provisions
of Article 9 loses the right to a deficiency in its entirety. 238 Revised Article 9239makes
the rebuttable presumption rule the standard for non-consumer transactions.

235

See generally Firsiar Bank Burlington, N.A. v. Stark Agricultural Services, Inc. (In re Kevin W.

Emerick Farms, Inc.), 201 B.R. 790, 797 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1996) (asserting while purpose of Article 9 § 203
is commercial certainty, document entitled "security agreement" solely defines extent of creditor security
interest); Hoagland v. Beabout (In re Beabout), 110 B.R. 883, 887 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1990)
(clarifying Revised Article 9 states that security interest over personal property is lost unless its interest is
recorded against real estate by making a fixture filing; and therefore, Revised Article 9 allows notice to real
estate owners and encumbrances of purchase money securities in personalty); Multibank Nat'l of Western
Mass. v. State Street Auto Sales, Inc. (In re State Street Auto Sales, Inc.), 81 B.R. 215, 217
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (observing Revised Article 9 requires filing consignor to give written notification to
secured creditor of his interest in goods, and failure to comply with filing provisions of Article 9 results in
interest junior to that of secured creditor).
236 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-610(a) (1999) (stating "([a]fier default, a secured party may sell, lease,
license,
or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its present condition or following any commercially
reasonable preparation or processing"); id. § 9-610 (b) (1999) (stating "[e]very aspect of a disposition of
collateral, including the method, manner, time, place, and other terms, must be commercially reasonable.");
In re After Six, Inc., 177 B.R. 219, 227 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding U.C.C. does not apply to bank's
sale of note unless note was pledged as security, thus creating secured transaction); Cummings
v. Cummings (In re Cummings), 147 B.R. 738, 746 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1992) (holding secured creditor could
not assert deficiency claim against debtor nor enforce secured interest in remaining collateral).
237 See Presidential Financial Corp. v. Snead (In re Snead), 231 BR. 823, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1999)
(affirming when creditor fails to give notice, rebuttable presumption rule applies and presumption is raised
that value of collateral is equal to indebtedness); In re Darling, 207 BR. 253, 255 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997)
(observing that persuasive authority supports rebuttable presumption rule when secured party disposes of
collateral in commercially unreasonable manner); id. (stating presumption is fair market value of collateral
at time of repossession is equal to outstanding balance of debt); LoPUCKI, ET AL., supra note 200, at 702
(stating majority ofjurisdictions hold rebuttable presumptions that value of collateral was not at least equal

to value of debt).
238

See LOPUCKI, ET AL., supra note 200, at 702 (indicating minority of courts hold "any significant

irregularity in the sale procedure is sufficient to deny the deficiency altogether"); see also J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 933 (4th ed. 1995) (noting minority of states allow deficiency
reduced by damages due to commercially unreasonable sale that debtor can prove). See generally Revised
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Courts also disagree about the effect of a secured creditor's retention of
collateral after repossession when there has been no agreement to accept the
collateral in discharge of the secured obligation consistent with the requirements of
current U.C.C. section 9_505.240 Some courts have held that prolonged retention
amounts to a constructive strict foreclosure. 241 Again, Revised Article 9 advances
the doctrine of party autonomy and makes acceptance of collateral by a secured
party effective as a satisfaction of the secured obligation only if the secured party
affirmatively assents. 242
The cumulative effect of these two modifications to the current regime of
calculation of deficiencies will increase the amount of unsecured claims of secured
U.C.C. § 9-626, Official Cmt. 4 (recognizing § 9-626 allows court to determine applicable rules when
amount of deficiency or surplus is issue in non-consumer transactions).
239 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-626(a):
In an action arising from a transaction, other than a consumer transaction, in which the
amount of a deficiency or surplus is in issue, the following rules apply:
(3) [Ihf a secured party fails to prove that the collection, enforcement, disposition,
or acceptance was conducted in accordance with the provisions of this part
relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance, the liability of a
debtor or a secondary obligor for a deficiency is limited to an amount by which
the sum of the secured obligation, expenses, and attorney's fees exceeds the
greater of:
(A) the proceeds of the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance;
or
(B) the amount of proceeds that would have been realized had the noncomplying secured party proceeded in accordance with the provisions of this
part relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance.
Id.; see also Revised U.C.C. § 9-626 (a), Official Cmt. 3 (affirming rebuttable presumption rule is
established for transactions other than consumer transactions).
240 See In re Durastone Co. Inc., 223 B.R. 396, 405 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1998) (claiming debtor's deficiency
claim is barred because his conduct manifests intent to retain collateral in full satisfaction of debt); see also
Lamp Fair, Inc. v. Perez-Ortiz, 888 F.2d 173, 176 (1st Cir. 1989) (referring to U.C.C.
§ 9-505 stating that retention of collateral normally satisfies debt completely and secured party must
abandon any claim for deficiency); Deephouse Equip. Co., Inc. v. Knapp (In re Deephouse Equipment Co.,
Inc.), 38 B.R. 400, 404 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (finding when creditor takes possession of collateral that
secures debt and debtor subsequently gives notice that act was in accord and satisfaction, burden is on
debtor to prove that debt was intended to be discharged).
241 See Gail Hillebrand, Symposium: Consumer Protection and The Uniform Commercial Code,
The
Uniform Commercial Code Drafling Process: Will Articles 2, 2b And 9 be Fair to Consumers?,
75 WASH. U. L.Q. 69, 130-31 (1997) (discussing virtues of doctrine of constructive strict foreclosure); see
also Steven 0. Weise, 1991 Survey: Uniform Commercial Code, UC.C. Article 9--Personal Property
Secured Transactions, 46 Bus. LAW. 1711, 1775 (1991) (criticizing rule while noting that excessively long
retention of collateral is factor that may be considered in connection with commercial reasonableness of
sale); see e.g. Vogel v. Carolina Int'l, Inc., 711 P.2d 708, 712 (Colo. App. 1985) (observing that to obtain
valid strict foreclosure, creditor must first give proper notice to debtor and debtor fails to object within 21
days of such notice).
242See Revised U.C.C. § 9-620(a) (commenting in non-consumer transactions, secured creditor may also
agree to accept collateral in partial satisfaction of indebtedness). But see Revised U.C.C. § 9-620(g) (1999)
(stating acceptance of surrendered collateral in consumer context mandates full satisfaction). See also In re
Nardone, 70 B.R. 1010, 1016 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (noting to have claim barred because of retention of
collateral, secured creditor must give written notice of its proposal to retain in satisfaction of debt).
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creditors in bankruptcy cases. However, given the low percentage of distributions
on unsecured claims, secured creditors will generally not receive significantly more
money.243 Yet the increased amount of unsecured claims may give partially secured
creditors control, or at least greater leverage within the class of unsecured creditors
in reorganization cases. 244 This will certainly dilute recoveries for other unsecured
creditors. More significantly, these revised provisions again demonstrate the
commitment of the Drafting Committee to a jurisprudence emphasizing the
significance of the objective manifestations of assent by the parties, rather than
substantive policies of social equity or redistribution of wealth.245
CONCLUSION
Revised Article 9 clarifies several areas of confusion that exist under current
law. It also broadens the scope of transactions covered by Article 9 and simplifies
perfection. Revised Article 9 also extends the secured creditors' interests in
proceeds of collateral. With few exceptions these changes expand the range of
private agreements that will be judicially enforceable. Because persons who were
not parties to a particular secured transaction did not participate in the creation of
the parties' private law agreement, 246 broadening the domain of Article 9 will
reduce the rights of third parties.
Enhancing private party autonomy is not the principal goal of the Bankruptcy
Code. Rather, its twin goals are the collective enforcement of claims recognized by
state law and rehabilitation of the debtor. The potential for collision between the
private law-making legitimated by Article 9 and the public/private mix of the
Bankruptcy Code pervades the decisions in bankruptcy cases. The border between
recognition of party autonomy and distributional values is not always clear, but
243

See Point Wylie Co. v. Tega Cay Dev. Co., Inc. (In re Point Wylie Co.), 78 B.R. 453, 459-60

(Bankr. D.S.C. 1987) (asserting distribution of unsecured claims will lessen percentage of distribution for
unsecured creditors).
244 See, e.g., First Fed. Bank of California v. Weinstein (In re Weinstein),
227 B.R. 284, 293
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (claiming undersecured creditor can elect to have its claim treated as fully secured);
In re Smeltzer, 47 B.R. 77, 79 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1985) (holding that because trustee plan did not provide

for all partially secured creditors to share in distribution it was discriminatory).
245 See generally In re Purity Ice Cream Co., Inc., 90 B.R. 183, 188 (Bankr. D. S.C..
1998) (stating while
evidence of intention between parties to create security interest was lacking, evidence of true lease was
sufficient to perfect interest); In re Housecraft Indus., USA, Inc., 155 B.R. 79, 90 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1993)
(asserting Article 9 reiterates that notification to bailee perfects interest in collateral).
246 Revised U.C.C. § 9-601(d) elevates the duties of the secured creditor to guarantors to a
plane
equivalent to the debtor. See Revised U.C.C. § 9-601(d) (noting "[e]xcept as otherwise provided ... after
default, a debtor and an obligor have the rights provided in this part and by agreement of the parties"). Even
without explicit statutory support many courts had reached this conclusion under current Article 9. See, e.g.,
Earl of Loveless, Inc. v. Gabele, 2 Cal. App. 4th 27, 33 (1991) (asserting when third party assumes
obligations to creditor, debtor remains liable on promissory note); First American Bank of New York v.
Wassel, 601 N.Y.S.2d 994, 995 (1993) (recognizing guarantor may not waive his right to commercially
reasonable sale).
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Revised Article 9 expands the sweep of private law farther than it extends now.
Whether this increase enhances productive economic activity is an empirical
question awaiting analysis. But there can be no question that Revised Article 9 will
further reduce assets available for distribution to unsecured creditors in bankruptcy.

